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Hispanic Migrant Labor in Oregon, 1940-1990, describes the history and conditions of
Hispanic farmworkers migrating from the southwestern U nited States, Mexico, and Latin
America after the 1940s. This paper uncovers the history and contribution o f a people
easily forgotten, but essential to the well-being o f the economy and the cultural diversity
o f Oregon. Though much has been lost in the comings and the goings o f these people,
bits and pieces have been recovered from old newspaper clippings, occasional documents
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recording the concerns and responses of the federal and state governments, rare articles
tucked away in little known periodicals, and interviews.
A history o f the migration and a general profile of the Hispanic migrant opens
the paper, followed by a description of the health, housing, and work conditions. I then
outline the migrants’ attem pt to advance through education and to settle out. I describe
the poverty they lived in and the treatm ent they generally received in society.
The next chapter details the external factors which affected the recruiting, hiring,
and daily conditions of work. I assess the role o f the contractor, who was closely
involved with the daily lives of the migrants and then explore the farmers and the
economy in which they functioned in terms of the effect they had on the migrants. The
governm ent and its response to the migrants and its apparent philosophy and policies
are studied. The efforts, as well o f lack of effort, of some of the governm ent’s
representatives are looked at as well.
In the third chapter, I describe the attem pt o f members of the migrant
community to care for one another. This covers both the cultural cohesiveness found
within the community and union activism. It also includes the concerted efforts made by
ex-migrants, Chicanos, and religious and secular activists.
The information obtained came from local newspapers, regional government
documents, and journals found at the libraries of Portland State University, Reed
College, Lewis and Clark College, and the Oregon Historical Society. Interviews are
also included as well as invaluable theses and dissertations from students of Northwest
academic institutions.
This research found that Hispanic farmworkers played an im portant role in the
agricultural economy of Oregon. They did not, however, receive fair retribution.
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Farmworkers’ wages and conditions rem ained substandard. They were not protected by
the National Labor Relations Act and state government left their conditions unregulated
as well.
The role o f the growers and contractors also rem ained unchecked, leaving it to
the discretion o f each individual involved, whose m onetary interests often dictated his
decision-making, regardless of its effects on the migrants. The economic outlook for
migrants did and will continue to remain glum as long as com petition within the
Am erican system and with corporations in the Third W orld persists, encouraging farmers
to keep wages and the costs o f benefits and camp conditions low.
On the other hand, the m igrants’ culture, religion, and familial relations
strengthened their ability to survive. Ex-migrants, community activists, and union
activists also provided support, pushing for better conditions and rights for the migrants.
I have concluded that without a drastic change in the perform ance of the governm ent
and in the economic system, the cause o f the inhumane migrant conditions will not be
eliminated.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The people of Oregon live in one of the most plentiful regions o f the United
States, where the soil is rich and the weather mild, making quality conditions for
strawberries, pears, nuts and other crops. Although most don’t work or live in the
farmland they depend on the fruits and vegetables grown and picked there.
For most people, the food magically appears. If an image exists it is one of a
family farm, with country people gathering to pick the fruit, just as on the television
commercials, while the real people who work the fields are silent, hidden, lost,
somewhere between the fields and the fruitbowl placed on the kitchen table.
History, however, reveals a different scene -- impoverished Hispanic migrants,
stooping, picking, hoeing and sorting the crops. H our upon hour, for up to twelve hours
each day, they toil, often in the hot sun or the cold, driving rain. Images o f the fields in
which they work and live in do not come easily to mind for most Americans have never
seen them. But the fact remains that the migrants play an integral part in the survival of
each and evety Oregonian.
W hat has been left behind in written form tells the story of the rise and fall of
the num ber of migrants passing through Oregon, toiling in the fields without reaping the
profits gained on the farms, enduring through their own ingenuity. Since 1940 the
num ber o f Hispanic migrants travelling to Oregon has risen consistently, outnumbering
all others after the 1960s. W hat is written tells o f conditions painfully hard to accept,
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and o f low wages few Americans would believe exist in the states. Recordings since 1940
show the distress of Hispanic migrants’ daily lives caused by an economic system based
on fierce competition. U nder this capitalist economy contractors and struggling or
corporate farms abandoned their responsibilities for housing and work conditions. For
many reasons, including the stresses put upon them by the system they functioned within,
those who used these people’s labor provided only a miniscule opportunity for them to
m ake any, let alone significant, improvements in their lives. Yet, there is no doubt that
without them Oregon farmers would not continue to survive or profit under the existing
economic structure.
Although diligent individuals, sometimes united in groups, pushed for
government protection of Hispanic farmworkers in Oregon, little resulted. Local
governments lacked finances, as well as concern at times, and state and federal
governments felt the lobbying pressures from agribusiness, leaving little incentive to act.
Even when other migrant workers and distressed farmers were aided, mostly during the
New Deal and World W ar II, the government offered very little help to Oregon migrant
workers.
Instead of vulnerable, "tradition-bound indolent" workers, many of the
Mexican-American migrants travelling out of the Southwest had to be, and were,
"risk-taking entreprenuers who engaged in a geographically expanded economic
occupation" (Wells 1976, 268). Initially many planned to make this merely a supplement
to their regular income, to allow them to improve conditions for themselves and for their
children. Some saved enough money to move out of the migrant stream. Others were
able to provide their children with more training and education than they themselves had
enjoyed.
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Unfortunately many more were unable to climb out of the cycle of poverty. Most
o f those who ventured to the Pacific Northwest continued to struggle to make ends
meet. Joined together in family units, most remained under the control o f a contractor,
which usually m eant migrants lost even more money.
The histoiy and contribution o f Hispanic migrants in Oregon since 1940 remains
largely untold. Though much has been lost with the comings and goings of these people,
bits and pieces can be recovered from old newspaper clippings, occasional documents
recording the concerns and responses of the federal and state government, rare articles
tucked away in little known periodicals, and interviews.
It is im portant to view the histoiy of the Hispanic farmworker in Oregon
chronologically. A general trend o f numbers and travel and recruitment procedures
appears below. Settled Hispanic communities in rural Oregon and support systems that
have helped the migrants have developed since 1940. Some change in the response of
Oregon residents, especially in the rise of activists and volunteers has also occurred over
time.
While some of this history fits into a chronological framework, much does not.
That is to say, many aspects of this history have remained constant, persisting throughout
time. Migrant wages, housing, work conditions, health, and success in education have all
remained relatively consistent. As well, with few exceptions, contractors and farmers
steadily maintained relations with the migrants that were destructive to the latter’s
well-being economically and emotionally. Government response to the migrants’ plight
was minimal throughout this time period. Because of the persistent trends in these areas
a m ore thematic approach has been used.
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The history of Hispanic migrant labor dates back before 1940. Contextual
information for the period after 1940 proves most relevant to the understanding o f their
histoiy. The history of the migration and a general profile o f the Hispanic migrant
opens the paper, followed by a description o f the health, housing and work conditions. I
then outline the migrants’ attem pt to advance through education and to settle out,
leaving the migrant stream, describing their overwhelming poverty and the treatm ent
they generally received in society.
The next chapter details the external factors which affected the recruiting, hiring
and daily conditions of work. I assess the role of the contractor, who was closely
involved with the daily lives o f the migrants and then explore the fanners and the
economy in which they function in terms of the effect they had on the migrants. The
government and its response to the migrants and its apparent philosophy and policies
are studied. The efforts, as well of lack o f effort, of some of the government’s
representatives are looked at as well.
In the third chapter I describe the attempt o f members of the migrant community
to care for one another. This covers both the cultural cohesiveness found within the
community and union activism. It also includes the concerted efforts m ade by
ex-migrants, Chicanos and religious and secular activists.
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CHAPTER II

T H E MIGRANTS

M IG RA N T TRENDS

The history o f Mexican migration to the U nited States, and in particular to the
Pacific Northwest, spans many generations. Although the decades following 1940 saw
the greatest num bers of Hispanic migrants come through Oregon the earlier tim e period
is necessary to cover briefly. Most of O regon’s Hispanic m igrant workers have labored
on farms. Mexicans came to Oregon as early as the m id-nineteenth century as arrieros
or m uleteers led their animals into the mining camps of northern California and
southern Oregon. Later, Mexicans joined other sheepherders, settling in eastern Oregon
to tend some o f the three million sheep grazing the plains. The presence o f the Mexican
vaquero can also be found in Oregon during the 1800s (Slatta 1979, 155).
Aside from the above m entioned, most Mexican, and later, Latin American,
migrants who ventured to Oregon did so as a result of economic hardship. W hen the
Spanish invaded the area now known as Mexico, creating haciendas and a rigid caste
system, the natives suffered. The 1913 Agrarian Revolution, led by intellectuals, had
looked hopeful for the landless and the poor. Land was seized and redistributed, but in
1918 Z apata was assassinated and survivors of the regime began to rebel. W hat
proceeded was a bloody struggle between the powers that had previously existed - the
church, military, foreign capital, industrial powers, large rural landowners and those
representing the agrarian movement. As fighting worsened, people left, some heading
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north, crossing over the border to find peace and avoid the economic disaster the war
was bound to bring (G alarza 1964, 40). Little had changed. In the 1920s, for instance,
in the state o f Jalisco, Mexico, 96.2% were landless farm families and in the state of
Varacruz 98.9% w ere landless, working the land that had once been theirs.
Simultaneously, an increased need for workers on the expanding cotton and vegetable
farms further encouraged Mexicans to head for the Southwestern States. As the
m igration continued, the Mexican population of Texas increased from 71,062 to 683,681
between 1900 and 1930. The surplus of labor forced some to pick beans and hops in
O regon while others worked on the railroad labor gangs which built the Northwest rails
(G utierrez 1983, C9).
W ages in the Southwest rem ained low throughout the twentieth century
com pared with the rest o f the U nited States, insuring the steady flow o f Mexicans and
M exican-Americans to the north in search o f work steady (Wells 1976, 267). Some of
those Mexicans, as well as M exican-Americans who had always lived in what becam e the
Southwestern U nited States, began to make it to the Northwest, becoming perm anent
residents (G am boa 1984, 21).
T he real thrust of migration of Hispanic workers to the N orthw est began in the
1940s. During the w ar effort farm ers were bent on keeping wages low and conditions
cheap. The farm ers were willing to tiy anything before they would give into the
demands o f dom estic workers which included higher wages and b etter conditions
(G am boa 1984, 33). First O regon farmers tried to organize a w om an’s army to pick the
crops, but it wasn’t enough. W ith the Anglo labor gone, the Japanese interned, and the
farm ers’ fear o f union activity and labor unrest, Oregon farmers turned to the braceros,
which the governm ent had already begun to contract from Mexico and transport to
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California farm ers. And though it was mainly the larger farms that used the braceros,
most farm ers liked the program because it kept wages, unionism, and, to some extent,
labor unrest down (G am boa 1984, 33; Robertson 1969, 5).
It was during this tim e that Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, began playing a
significant role as agricultural laborers in Oregon. Some were Mexicans migrating over
the border while others were Chicanos, citizens of the Southwest. Braceros were hired
on mostly as pickers, with some being assigned work as handy men, irrigators, pruners,
tractor drivers and sorters. U nder the federal government act between 1943 and 1947,
46,072 single m en worked the fields in Oregon and were then sent hom e, a practice later
expanded by the bracero program (Gamboa 1984, 99). Public Law 78, the bracero
program, was enacted in 1951 as a two year program, but, with persistent pressure from
the farm lobby, lasted until 1965. U nder this program up to 1000 Mexicans worked
annually in O regon after 1947, mainly in the pear orchards o f the Rogue Valley (Bianco
1963a, 15).
M ost cam e from central Mexico, one o f the poorest, most rural regions in the
country. They heard of the opportunity through word o f mouth, radio or ads, and then
headed from their small towns or farms to the stadium in Mexico city, m eeting up with
thousands o f others like themselves. Few would ultimately pass the health exams, which
included venereal disease, x-ray and serological tests. Those selected were then
photographed, vaccinated for small pox, had the work contract explained to them , and
were put on a train which, 4 to 6 weeks later, arrived in the Northwest (Gam boa 1984,
154).
Once those few arrived, many experienced cultural shock. There was the new
language; extremely hard work; cold w eather worsened by inappropriate clothing;
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tasteless, non-Mexican food; lack o f culture; family and leisure activities; and, outside the
camp, hostile reaction from local citizens (Gamboa 1984, 173).
W hen the government program ended Northwest farm ers gave up the braceros
because the government refused to continue covering the cost o f transporting them , an
expense o f approximately $135 per bracero. Instead, farm ers began to rely on
Mexican-Americans from the Southwest, who they estim ated were cheaper (Gam boa
1984, 33). The largest num bers found their way from Texas, New Mexico and California
through contractors or on their own. Industrial development after W orld W ar II and
land consolidation reduced crops and agricultural jobs in southern Texas, while
discrimination kept Chicanos from getting other kinds o f jobs. Futherm ore, the new
absentee landlords in the Southwest left migrants without connections or the jobs they
had once relied on, which forced them to search elsewhere (Wells 1976, 267).
Despite public opinion, almost all of these migrants were U.S. citizens. Between
the end of the bracero program and the 1970s migrants came mostly from the Southwest.
In the 1980s this would change as economic conditions in Mexico in the late seventies
left many without a way to survive.

T H E M IGRANTS - NUM BERS

For a variety o f reasons, estimates o f the num ber of migrants, and the
percentage of Hispanics among them, working each season in O regon have been sketchy.
Statistics found in newspapers, government documents and private reports conflict.
Incomplete records kept by farmers or contractors due to tax reasons and the m igrants’
own fears of reporting their whereabouts to those they didn’t trust, especially if they
were illegal aliens, rem ained problems in collecting accurate numbers. Governm ent

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

9

agencies conducting surveys experienced hostility from farm ers, migrants and other
government agencies, and, because o f understaffing, only perform ed random samplings.
The results also varied depending on the time of the sum m er because migrants moved
from place to place, causing them to be left out o f the count, o r counted twice.
The most complete numbers came from the M igrant H ealth Project, an Office of
Equal O pportunity funded program, but it only covered certain counties and only lasted
from 1963 to 1971. Using the most accurate statewide estim ates from the Oregon
D epartm ent o f Labor, the migrant population can be averaged at approximately 61,200
between 1958 and 1968, dropping off continually thereafter. D uring the 1950s and 1960s
the counties containing 90% o f the migrants were Clackamas, H ood River, Jackson,
Klamath, Linn, M alheur, Marion, Polk, Jefferson, Deschutes, Crook, Um atilla,
W ashington and Yamhill. Within those counties most of the migrants worked in the
W illam ette Valley, the far southeast corner of the state, and the H ood River region
(Oregon Migrant Health Project 1970).
Several significant trends developed between 1950 and the present. Agricultural
labor declined 50% in size, with each year’s numbers rising or falling according to the
need and to th e previous two years’ wage level and housing conditions. In the 1950s,
almost all of the farmworkers, excluding the braceros, were U.S. citizens (Slatta 1979,
156; Smith 1966, 4). Later, Mexican-American and Mexican migrants increasingly
replaced Anglo migrants. Between 1966 and 1970 Hispanic migrants rose from 28% to
70% o f all migrants in the Northwest (Slatta 1979,155). W hile some o f the
Spanish-speaking migrants became settled farm workers in O regon over the years other
migrants, mostly illegal Mexican workers, replaced them . By the 1980s only 12.8% o f the
perm anently settled Chicanos in Oregon still worked primarily in farm labor, with 6
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Oregon counties counting over 2,500 Hispanic perm anent residents (Slatta and Atkinson
1984, 110).
A fter the 1970s many m ore migrants came from outside the country. Eighty-five
to 90 percent were from Mexico, with a disproportionate num ber coming from Mixteca,
Oxahaca, Mexico w here poverty and unemployment was higher than other areas (Jack
C orbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990).

G E N E R A L CHARACTERISTICS O F TH E M IG R A N T

The stereotype of the Hispanic migrant farm w orker does not fit many, although
one generalization has proven to be true. Economic hardship caused many to turn to or
continue in this line of work. Some, once small landowners, lost w hat they had during
one o f the many bad economic times in Mexico or in another Latin Am erican country.
O thers fled from political persecution, especially Central Am ericans after the 1970s.
Some w anted to add to what they may already have had in their hom e country. This
desire may have been to afford m ore land, to start a small business, to educate their
children o r to better support their extended family. Profiles o f workers were reported
after som e were able to come out of hiding when they acquired citizenship after the 1986
Im m igration and Reform Control Act. Enrique and Graciela Sanchez from Tom altlan,
Mexico, for instance, had previously owned a tortilla factory and a hom e and were
wealthy enough to hire help. When the economy turned bad in 1979 they were forced to
sell their hom e and resorted to paying $1,900 to a "coyote" hired to smuggle them across
the border. They and their four children lived in a trailer, working the fields o f Oregon
(Cowen 1987b, D l).
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Indeed a state o f economic desperation plagued most migrants. In 1987 it was
estim ated that 50% of all Mexicans in Mexico were underem ployed or unemployed while
50% lived without electricity or running w ater (Cowen 1987b, D l).
Regardless of their previous state, as m igrants they were forced to lead a
different life, travelling from place to place, w herever needed, squatting, stooping or
reaching on ladders, most likely with wife and child straining beside them 10 to 12 hours
a day, six days a week. In the course o f a year they might travel "as many as three to
five thousand or m ore miles, working from six to a dozen crops" (Loprinzi 1947, 10).
Some conditions and trends have changed since the 1940s. In the 1950s and
1960s most Spanish-speaking migrants were either unm arried o r without their families.
W hile most arrived on their own as many had before them, some were recruited to the
N orthwest by the governm ent (Oregon G overnor’s Task Force 1969, 4).
Their trip to the north was grueling. They rode in old cars which often broke
down, leaving them stranded. Many struggled to adapt to the unfam iliar cold weather,
even as they rode in the back of a truck in clothes useful only in a warm Southwest.
They encountered hostile aggression from local citizens as they passed through small
rural comm unities (G am boa 1984, 294). O ften under contract with a crew leader or
contractor, who usually had an unwritten agreem ent with a certain num ber o f farms, the
w orkers were loaned travel money at high interest rates or brought in cars or trucks by
the contractor and assured o f housing in a m ajor camp. Once in Oregon, their
contractor established credit with banks, stores and taverns, to be paid back with interest
to both the contractor and the business providing services (Infante and Current 1958,
C2; Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969, 11).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

12

In the 1960s as farm ers’ associations took over the recruitm ent, m ore and more
Spanish-speaking families arrived during the February to O ctober harvest season, usually
without funds and having no connections with a crew leader, contractor o r workplace,
rem aining sometimes days or weeks. These families often failed to find steady work,
even during the busiest part of the season. They struggled to find those who would sell
them items on credit, relying on relatives to loan small sums o f money, or, if absolutely
necessary, on aid from religious, volunteer or government agencies where it could be
found (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1964/65).
Single young men and children continue to be a dom inant group in the fields of
Oregon. One study in the late 1950s documented that 50% o f the children over the age
o f eight worked, and reports in the Oregonian regularly cited children not going to
summ er school because they were needed in the fields. One reporter quoted a worker
as saying, "If the children don’t work you cain’t [sic] hardly m ake it" (Payne 1959). In
1971 an American Friends Service Committee report on child labor, surveying Oregon,
Washington, Ohio, M aine and California concluded that 25% o f all farm workers in the
U.S. were under 16 years old (Berman and Aiches 1971, 1). In the 1980s young m en
and whole families continued to work the fields. One 15 year old said he m igrated each
year. H e had worked in Los Angeles as a busboy, repaired cars for people referred by
friends in Oregon and worked the fields o f Oregon (Olmos 1983a, MW D2). Again in
1989 it was estim ated that 25% of all migrant labor in the nation was still under the age
of 16 (Frontline 1990).
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CONDITIONS O F T H E M IG RA N T

The conditions the migrants encountered were symbolic o f the overall attitude
towards migrants that prevailed among farmers, local residents and governm ent
representatives throughout the entire tim e period from the 1940s to 1990. Though there
was little intent to harm the farmworkers, there was also far too little intent to help
them . The migrants were seen as transient and therefore tem porary, and thus money
was often not appropiated for their care. A nother impression many had reinforced this
lack of action. Some believed that the migrants were used to, and therefore satisfied
with, the horrid conditions.

M igrant Wages
The extremely low wages that the farm workers endured can be traced to the lack
o f political protection awarded other workers in the U nited States. This lack of
protection dates back to the loss of power experienced by domestic farm workers at the
turn o f the century. The loss o f power was preceded by the strides industrialists and
large farmowners made during and after the Gilded Age (Feise 1978, 79). Bankrupted
farm ers of this earlier time joined other migrants as farmworkers or urban industrial
workers, and with their political and eonomic power stripped in Congress, they watched
the legislative scales slant to protect large landowners’ interests in direct opposition to
their needs. While urban industrial interests became stronger in their representation in
the government, rural concerns, especially landless migrants, were silenced. The rural
problems resolved often involved the large landowners (Milk 1972). The belief that
migrants o f this time were only temporary and would fulfil the Am erican D ream some
day reinforced the justification not to aid them (G am boa 1984, 333). These farmworkers
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were incapable o f establishing any law like the N ational Labor Relations Act to protect
them . N or were they able to direct the agricultural research which w orsened the
m igrants’ plight and was funded by the government.
Because o f the use o f the machinery, often invented through this agricultural
research, the num ber o f all agricultural workers, m any of whom were migrants, declined.
The num ber o f agricultural workers fell nationally from 3 million to 1.5 million between
1919 and 1967, dropping from 35% to 3% o f the A m erican population betw een 1910 and
1976. Later, with the use o f foreign labor, farm workers becam e an even m ore invisible
and vulnerable group (Feise 1978, 76).
While in 1966 the national annual agricultural wage earnings stood at $1,240, or
$935 if doing only farm work, in 1989 the average m igrant fam ily earned $8,000 a year
com pared to $24,000 for the average Am erican family in all other areas o f work
(Frontline 1990; Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 115; Statistical A bstract o f the U nited States
1990, 451).
The D epartm ent o f Agriculture’s job was to establish fair annual wage rates.
These rates did not, however, maintain a fair wage because the seasonal crop production
and the going rate of sale often convinced farm ers and contractors to quietly pay the
rate they chose. Meanwhile, the quoted wage rates put out by the regional Farm
Bureaus were often higher than the actual wage rates because they were given by the
farm ers, who wanted to convince teenagers o r the urban unemployed to pick. These
wages were based on fast, professional pickers working full-time. For example, in 1965
the Oregonian sent a college-aged reporter out to pick, checking the hourly rate. H e
w rote, "In some cases growers have claimed earnings between $1.25 and $2.00 an hour
for an experienced teenage worker." This reporter worked ten hours in a "good field"
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and m ade $8.50, equalling $.85 an hour. A nother staff w riter sent his oldest son out who
m ade $1.75 all day (Oregonian June 27, 1965, 31).
W ages fluctuated slightly from region to region and from season to season, and,
unless a com plaint was filed, wage payments were rarely checked by the government
inspectors (Gam boa 1984, 300). The Oregon Bureau o f Labor and Industries was
responsible for m onitoring compliance o f the minimum wage law but had "so far not
extended the audits to agricultural employers" (M artinis 1990, DIO). In 1990 the
minimum wage required was $4.20, but a study by the local union of Northwest
T reeplanters and Farmworkers United found that in 1989 farmworkers were underpaid
by two million dollars (McCarthy 1990b, B l). The union announced to a Oregon Senate
panel that all 18 o f the strawberry fields it m onitored in its study had broken the
minimum wage law (M artinis 1990, DIO).
W hen the migrants had been promised otherwise, o r if they didn’t like the rate,
there was very little they could do that year, owing on credit, trapped without funds,
away from their homes and lacking the knowledge from whom to seek help. There were
indications that the num ber o f migrants would decline for the next two years when they
had been exceptionally m istreated or tricked in a particular county or region, but, by and
large, the m igrants were often forced to accept the conditions they found for that year
(Infante and Current 1959, 40; Stein 1990, LI).
O nce this low wage was paid, and credit and interest for travel, housing and food
costs returned to stores and contractors very little was left. It was estim ated that 75% of
the m igrants’ income was spent in the region he worked in and that 22% of the
businesses in the area increased sales by the migrant spending (Oregon Migrant Health
Project 1969, 10). Obviously, it was nearly impossible to save any money.
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W hen the season ended in mid-October many returned hom e, most to the
Southwest, with little, if any, money in hand, to family, friends, or w inter work. During
the w inter time, whether they rem ained in Oregon or returned hom e, finding work
proved difficult. If they did find work it might be farm work, odd jobs, part-tim e factory
or mill work, auto repair, construction, babysitting, house cleaning, wood chopping or
seam stress work (Bianco 1983; M cDerm ott 1990; Oregon State B ureau o f Labor 1959).

Housing
During the bracero program most housing was run by the governm ent. Because
it was considered to be tem porary very little money was invested in it. The tents used
were the bare minimum in quality. Developed by the form er engineer of the Barnum
and Bailey circus, they were m ade to be put up and taken down quickly, and to sleep up
to 800 men. The men, accustomed to warm weather, never got used to the one wool
blanket and woodburning space heaters provided for the cold and rainy spring nights.
A fter the first few years the light-weight tents provided in these "farm labor supply
centers," as the government called them, gave no respite from the wind, dust, bugs, rain
or burning sun. The food, as well, was poor. So inadequate, in fact, that riots and
strikes broke out regularly among the braceros (Gamboa 1973, 60, 147). As well, the
chemicals used to sterilize the camps were poisonous, applied frequently and used
without well-known necessary precautions. Open privies and garbage pits joined
above-ground waste w ater to make a perfect breeding ground for disease (G am boa 1984,
147).
A fter the bracero program, housing improved, but this proved to be only
tem porary, lasting just a decade. For this first decade after the bracero program ended,
85% of the housing for Mexican-American workers was located on the private farms
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where they worked, allowing migrants the opportunity to plant gardens and live less
restrictive lives.
Later, farm ers becam e m ore paternalistic and controlling and thought o f cheaper
ways o f housing the migrants, hiring contractors and builders o f camps who used the
issue o f control as a main sales incentive. The first step was acquiring the governm ent
camps. No one foresaw the future better than the Secretary T reasurer o f the
International Longshorem an’s and W arehousem en’s U nion when he said in 1947,
"Turning these camps over to the growers is equivalent to a jail sentence against farm
workers" (Gamboa 1984, 246). After the war farm ers did purchase the old government
camps. They often raised the rent without maintaining the upkeep, as the Yamhill
County Farm Labor Association did in 1948 when it doubled the rent immediately after
acquiring a camp (Gamboa 1984, 333). This new housing was designed for multiple use
such as off-season garages or easy-access storage (G am boa 1973, 63). Old converted and
unconverted bam s were also used (Lopez 1976, 3; Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969,
20 ).
A fter the 1960s m ore families, instead o f lone men, arrived to work the fields.
But the old camps were still set up for single men staying only a short while. Bunkbeds
lined the walls o f the little rooms, units were not insulated for w inter, and toilets and
washrooms rem ained located outside the cabins (Stein 1990, L I).
An informal interview o f migrants and a 1969 governm ent study found that good
housing conditions were a primary factor in obtaining and m aintaining a stable labor
force, with migrants queried stating that good housing was second only to fair treatm ent
by the grower and was a deciding factor in their choice o f work (Oregon Migrant Health
Project 1969, 25; Smith 1966, 4). One government study in 1962 stated, "the visits to the
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m igrant camps in the valley revealed that migrants prefer paying rent, and even board if
the camps a re tolerable" (Bianco 1962a, 16). A nother found that "the cam p visits
showed that the migrant w orked on farms where suitable housing existed. Also, the
quality o f w orker was com m ensurated with the quality of housing available" (Bianco
1962b, 27). Regardless, conditions rarely climbed above a very low standard.
Several m ajor studies o f labor camps and housing were conducted: the 1958
B ureau of Labor study, and the 1962, 1966 and 1969 Governor’s R eport, conducted by
the Oregon State University Extension Service, the OSPIRG study in 1978 and a 1990
study by the Commission on Agricultural W orkers. W hat the studies found were
atrocious conditions for expensive rates that were up to an estim ated 50% o f the
m igrants’ wages (Infante and Current 1958, 20; McCarthy 1990a, B l). In 1958, 62.5%
lived with their family in a one room dwelling with no plumbing, heating, cooking
utilities or refrigeration. In the 1968 inspection o f the camps in Clackamas County, 88%
had no running w ater in sinks and 89% had no refrigeration (Oregon Migrant Health
Project 1968, 25). Some lived in barns holding large numbers o f men, and in other
camps open sewers flowed past housing or into swimming holes (Bianco 1962c, 23).
Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions caused one report to find that "odors from at
least one o f the camps could be smelled 100 feet from the nearest shack" (Lattie 1962,
1). There were always a few farm ers who would m ake improvements in the hopes of
acquiring the best workers, but for the most part things rem ained so bad that in 1970
one Bureau o f Labor official announced, "there are places being used right now you
wouldn’t put a dog in" (Smith 1966, 4).
In 1968 the Labor Program C hief of the Oregon State Board of H ealth, Taylor
Sandvigen, said that 10% of the state’s migrant housing should have been abolished
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immediately, and chances were that the num ber in that bad a state o f disrepair was far
higher, based on the lack of inspections done annually (Olm os 1968a, 17). O f the
majority o f camps, which regularly did pass inspections, Father David Z egar o f Cornelius
said, "most camps pass inspections . . . so obviously the standards a re low" (Butterworth
1991, C l). As will be discussed below, even when inspections occurred, rechecking the
farms even once to ensure corrections were made was nearly impossible with the small
staff and funding the state departm ents received for this duty. O ne account describes
this problem:
Tito Aguilar lives in a camp. . . . Officially the cam p was
closed because it did not m eet state health regulations.
M ost o f the cabin doors have been nailed shut. But when
Tito and his wife arrived they said the labor contractor
who leases the camp simply pulled the nails out o f the
door and let them move in on the condition they work for
him (Oregonian, 7 July 1972, 24).
The M igrant H ealth Project’s survey of corrections m ade in the years it functioned never
found m ore than 40% o f the corrections m ade in any o f the regions they worked in for
any o f the following conditions:

camp area, water supply, sewage disposal, living units,

lavatory and laundry or garbage disposal (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1964-71). In
1976 the O SPIR G report concluded, "camp conditions often do not m eet the state health
and safety standards, and that energetic enforcement o f the law by O H S is needed to
bring the camps into compliance" (Lopez 1976, 25). In 1990 the Commission on
Agricultural W orkers found that Oregon housing for the migrants was worse than
California’s or W ashington’s (Jack Corbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990).
M ore recently other factors have worsened the availability o f quality housing.
A fter the enactm ent o f IR C A illegals could not use federally funded housing and what
they could find they could not complain about (McCarthy 1990a, B l). With sources
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finding that between 60 to 75 percent of the migrants were undocum ented, this was
cause for alarm . "The illegal migrants are sleeping in cars or camping out. . . . A two
bedroom house in the Polk County town o f Independence is hom e for 52 migrants"
(McCarthy 1990b, B l). A nother account found "about 20 . . . w orkers living in parked
cars in and around the large berry fields where others sleep on thin sheets o f wood"
(Chan 1990, CIO). Also, in some regions of Oregon increased population allowed
landlords to raise the rent.
Field conditions were no better, typically having few facilities for the workers. A
study of another 100 Hispanic migrants in Oregon conducted in 1987 found 96%
disliking the living conditions, but fearing repercusions which kept them from
complaining (Cowen 1987a, A l). In one field only three broken-down toilets were
available for over 300 workers (Lopez 1976, 8). In a study done in 1984 all 100 migrants
said they had never been provided with hand washbasins, required by state law, and that
drinking supplies usually m eant one cup in a bucket o f water to be shared by all
employees. Only one of the 100 had ever seen toilet paper in the field, also required by
law (Hogan 1984, B l).
The problem of housing and field conditions was constantly brought up by
religious activists, health workers and a few adam ant government officials. Farm ers
claimed that they were unable to afford improvements or keep the farms up to state
standards, especially since they only used the labor for a short time each year. A t the
same time, however, they seemed to find the money to invest in expensive pieces of
machinery which they used each year for an even shorter time. This m ethod of farm
improvement which funded mechanization instead o f providing m ore efficient and
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hum ane labor policies was regularly reinforced by banks who willingly loaned money for
capital improvements (Hightower 1973; Milk 1972; Young and Newton 1980).
Many local residents were unaware o f the m igrants’ predicam ent. Those who
were often found it appalling. Some blam ed the migrants themselves for creating the
disgusting conditions while others, though concerned, felt that their com m unities should
bear the brunt. It can be assum ed that like Forest Grove’s and W oodburn’s citizens,
local residents throughout O regon rejected proposals, fearing increased num bers of
migrants, the burden o f becoming the hub for services and reduced land values (Joanne
Jessel, personal interview, 10 August 1990). The resistance felt in small comm unities
proved to be detrim ental to change. In response, the 1989 state legislature passed a law
which m ade it illegal for communities to create zoning laws to protect their areas from
migrant housing. But this has not stopped residents from voting down levies required to
fund such projects (Butterworth 1991, C l).
Few communities, on the other hand, found it m ore productive to solve the influx
o f migrants by providing perm anant housing so that they did not have to spend annual
local resources for housing or food, and other costs of supporting an unemployed group
who often ended up under bridges, on streets and in fields before or at the end of the
season. These few towns took m atters into their own hands, building housing projects to
settle the migrants. In 1982 Forest Grove constructed a 50 unit project and attem pted
to raise another, but the citizens voted it down (Stewart 1982, MW7).

H ealth
The health hazards o f migrant labor m ade it one o f the most dangerous
occupations. Constant travel, poverty wages, stoop labor and exposure to cold and hot
w eather created troubling effects. Pesticides, herbicides and insecticides caused health
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problems. T he diet o f the m igrant was also inadequate. T he m igrants' diet was related
to their labor. The wages kept their consumption low. A nd the camp conditions and
work hours reduced their ability to cook nutritious meals.
W hen the governm ent camps existed for the braceros, and similarly when the
farm ers took these over, food provided for the workers was in inadequate quantities and
often spoiled, causing food poisoning, because o f the m ethods and procedures the
governm ent and farm ers employed. Preparation was hours early and th e unrefrigerated
food was set o u t in the sun-drenched field for up to eight hours (G am boa 1984, 147;
Oregon Migrant Health Project 1964-71).
A t a G rants Pass hop ranch in 1943, 500 o f the 511 w orkers got food poisoning
(Gam boa 1984, 147). In 1945 it became such a serious problem that the Mexican
embassy requested that Northwest labor camps improve the food quality and quantity or
Mexico would consider cancelling its contract (G am boa 1984, 148).
In 1947, when the feeding of the braceros was abandoned by the governm ent and
taken over by the farm association, things worsened. The private profit incentive caused
a reduction in the quality and quantity of the food. Recently, with the food buying and
preparation left to each family, the problem has taken another direction. Many camps
did not provide refrigeration, stove or cooking utensils. The migrating family relied on a
small portable stove and bought their food daily or used non-perishable food. M ost of
the protein foods were given up. As well, fresh food was hard to come by. The camp
was far away from m ajor m arkets and the workday too long and hard to have the tim e to
drive the distance daily. Even when they did have the fresh food many w ere so
exhausted after a 10 or m ore hour day that veiy little cooking occurred.
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Infant mortality rem ained 125% higher for farmworkers than for other
Am ericans (Kirchmeier 1980, B3). For those who did survive, the effects o f m igrant
work and life were also devastating. The diet o f both the adults and the children stayed
far below the recom mended daily requirem ent (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969, 29).
A study o f 60 children conducted by the State Board o f H ealth in 1970 a t the
Independence M igrant Sum mer School found 38% low in vitamin A, 36% below normal
height, 14.5% below normal weight, 17% low in vitamin C and 75% below the R D A in
vitamin intake as a whole (<Oregonian, 18 February 1970,11). In a study conducted by El
Centro Cultural in 1984, 50% o f the migrants, com pared to 20% o f Am ericans, failed
eye exams (Cargill 1984, B l).
Although migrants were far more afflicted by health problem s than the average
A m erican, migrants didn’t receive dental and medical benefits, and even when there
were services available the cost and distance kept migrants from using them . H ealth
worker Rebecca H art found that "‘many said they don’t have the money for a doctor or
can’t go unless they have someone to translate for them ’" (Fitzgibbon 1990, M P1). One
study found that farmworkers had 1.6 times m ore muscular problem s from the stoop
labor than the average American worker. Migrants were also very likely to be affected
by herbicides, insecticides and chemical fertilizer use in the fields, which may cause birth
defects, cancer and tuberculosis (Frisvold 1988, 876; Lopez 1976, 23). M igrants faced a
300% higher chance o f dying from an on-the-job accident than the average A m erican
w orker (Kirchm eier 1980, B3). Cam p conditions led to a high rate o f hepatitis,
parasites, respiratory and gastrointestinal problems. Communicable diseases afflicted the
workers because of inadequate and unclean facilities (Frisvold 1988, 877). Prostitution
in the camps was ram pant, with trucks o f girls brought out to do business; therefore
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venereal and other sexual diseases spread (Lopez 1976, 10; Oregon Migrant Health Project
1969, 30). The consequences were disasterous. University of Portland Professor and
researcher Joseph Gallegos stressed, "ask a farmworker who has been exposed to
pesticides all his life what is elderly and you’re likely to get an answer o f 45 years o f age"
(Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1).

EDUCATION

Hispanic migrants’ access to education never equalled that o f other Americans.
This in part was caused by a combination of things. The m igrants’ culture and language
caused them to be at a disadvantage. But, more so, their work conditions m ade it nearly
impossible for them to take advantage of any opportunities offered them . The
government lacked consistent effort in setting up programs which could have alleviated
the m igrants’ loss.
A t the same time, when success was found it was through the help o f these
programs, which were often dem anded by local o r state activists. But, the largest factor
for student progress was the motivated parents who wanted their children to have the
chance to climb out o f the cycle o f migration and poverty.
For both those who returned home and those who rem ained in Oregon,
educating their children proved hard. When migrants did send their children to school,
they encountered a two-edged sword. On the one hand they too may have believed in
the American dream , supposedly realized through education. But those who sent their
children lost their addition to the family income and ran the risk of their children losing
their culture. They surely feared exposing them to the harsh world o f unfriendly Anglos.
Twice as many migrants as settled Hispanics surveyed in Yakima had difficulty
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understanding the teacher, while 58% o f the migrant students worried about the clothes
they had to wear, and the poverty and cultural isolation their clothing showed (Gecas
1980, 591). As the majority o f school administrators in one study found, this feeling of
awkwardness led migrant children not to m ore disruptive behavior but rather to
withdraw. Add to that the adjustment to each new school, unprepared for the special
needs o f the m igrant student, and failure frequently m et them just around the corner.
Although many Hispanics persisted in sending their children to school, both those who
continue to m igrate and those who have settled, have found academic advancement
difficult and far too rare.
For those who m igrated, the average school attendence for their children
rem ained low. The harvest season cut into both the beginning and the end of the school
year, forcing the children to either miss several months or change schools frequently.
Those who attended were expected to learn and succeed in an unfam iliar language. The
children lost two to three weeks each time they moved, equalling 20 to 30 weeks a year.
In one study o f Yakima migrants and settled Hispanics, twice as many high school aged
migrants, com pared to the settled, missed school "often" (Gecas 1980, 590).
The Yakima study m entioned earlier found that both m igrant and settled parents
were very supportive and encouraging o f their children’s education and career
advancem ent, and that instead of cultural barriers, economic barriers in large part
caused the failure rate. The study was conducted in three towns with a population of
approximately 5,000, similiar to the size o f the Oregon towns o f W oodburn, Gervais and
Nyssa where many Hispanics reside as well. The study found that the aspirations o f the
children were high with many of their expectations of success stemming from the strong
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encouragem ent their parents gave them . Christina Gom ez, migrant and m other o f four,
explained h er efforts:
They have a good education. I like them to do everything
right. W e talk before they go to bed. I tell them I w ant to
hear from their teachers that they work hard. I push them
to study so when they are bigger they will get a good job,
not lead the sam e lives as their parents (M cD erm ott 1990,
K l).
As m igrant students arrived at the teen years, their expectations dropped
dramatically, because they becam e m ore realistic about their possibilities and limitations:
"This represents a gap between desire and perceived reality, a reality which appears
m ore grim as the child grows older" (Gecas 1980, 592). A t least for the first generation
o f the settled, the alienation o f the child, the cultural m isunderstanding betw een the
teacher and the children and the discrimination did not completely disappear because
the family was settled.
The educational program s set up for migrants did little to help. The program s
were conducted during the worst time of year for them - the sum m er - and thus they
could not take advantage o f them . Teachers had to be extremely determ ined and
com m itted to get the young children to come, as the following account m akes clear. At
4 A.M. the teachers had to help dress and load the young children on the bus which they
would drive out to the different camps.
But the all-im portant thing is that you be there to get the
children before their parents leave for the fields early in
the m orning . . . otherwise, the family takes all the kids,
and those not old enough to pick a berry sit in the car all
day (Guernsey 1969, 1).
A 17-year-old from Texas who attended the 1980 Hillsboro sum m er school
described the difficulties and the commitment needed: "‘I start picking at 4 a.m. I pick
until 4 p.m. I go hom e, shower, catch bus. Class starts at 6 p.m. and lasts until 8:50
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p.m. Then I go home to be ready to pick again at 4 a.m.’" (Leeson 1983, B l). And, in
their quest to learn English they found summer school classes extremely overcrowded,
further reducing their chances o f learning.
Although the settled fared better, many o f those also had very low success rates.
Those who had settled out still had m ore familial responsibilities than the Anglo
students, losing the ability to participate in after-school activities o r have tim e for
studies. Very few role models were available for these Hispanic students w ith few
Hispanics teaching in Oregon (Hinkley and Olmos 1983, B7). In 1970, 45% o f the
Hispanic adults settled in Oregon com pared to 24% Anglos still hadn’t finished high
school (Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 110). By the 1980s, little had changed for the
majority, with the dropout rate remaining at 43% for settled Hispanics in O regon
(Hinkley and Olmos 1983, B7; Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 111). A nother study done on
Hispanic adults over the age o f 50 in Oregon found that 82% o f them had com pleted
less than six years o f education (Fitzgibbon 1991, MP1).
O ther problems com pounded the school experience. Discrimination has
rem ained a factor. Although most educators have moved beyond stereotypes and
slanted perspectives, this attitude allowed one state school superintendent to claim in
1960 that the migrants were "educationally retarded." This and other destructive
perceptions have rem ained alive (W entworth 1960, 3). Chicano students felt the tension
over race. Many very isolated in Oregon schools, unlike in their Texas hometowns,
which were often largely Hispanic. T heir needed to affiliate with the few o th er Hispanic
students in their high school in Oregon helped the isolation but further alienated them
from the Anglos. In Forest Grove Hispanic students finally vented their frustration and
anger with violence (Hinkley and Olmos 1983, B7).
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SETTLING O U T

In the 1940s farm ers contracted farmworkers from Mexico to work in O regon
with the specific intent o f returning the workers at the end of each season. A fter the
bracero program, Hispanics from the Southwest joined Mexicans in migrating. Although
m ost returned home there were always a few who stayed on, settling in O regon because
o f the better wages, job opportunities or familial ties. By the 1960s several rural
Hispanic communities had developed throughout Oregon, providing impetus and support
for other migrants would would attem pt to make the transition o f settling in Oregon.
Living in these communities were those who would later push for better conditions for
the migrants and Oregon Hispanics in general.
Many migrants lacked formal education, a firm knowledge of the English
language, connections necessary to make a job change or seek help, or many savings.
They suffered from low wages and had large families. Their reliance on their own
culture and family network and their preference to remain in small towns, or return to
their hometowns after the season ended, further removed them from the outside world,
and from other lines o f work, located in urban areas (LaGra 1969; Slatta 1979; Stream
1976; Wells 1976). All of these reasons discouraged migrants from staying in Oregon
and from acquiring different work.
Though the effort required to settle out rem ained overwhelming, many migrants
did attem pt to move into urbanized areas or small towns to find alternate work.
Mechanization encouraged this trend since jobs became scarcer. This was an easier
transition for those who saw work in the fields as supplemental income (Bianco 1963, 14;
Cowen 1984, C2). At the same time, increasing numbers o f South American refugees
and illegals, and the continuing economic decline in the Southwest and elsewhere, often
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squeezed M exican-Americans out o f farm labor because o f even cheaper wages (Wells
1976, 268).
Im portant studies of settled ex-migrants in Washington and W isconsin provide
inform ation on the environm ent needed to encourage migrants to settle out. In
Wisconsin, Wells found that if a migrant family regularly visited friends o r relatives who
settled out, then they had a higher likelihood of attem pting it themselves, because o f the
familiarity and connections they gained. On the other hand familial ties also
discouraged migrants from settling out, especially if as a family economic unit they had
been successful. The loss o f the earnings o f the family m em ber o r family who left the
migrant stream often m eant suffering for the rest of the unit (Wells 1976, 269).
In the 1970 Federal Census o f Oregon 66% of the settled Hispanics were urban,
30% rural, with 12.8% still working on farms (Slatta 1979, 156). And by the 1980s Slatta
would contend that, "the migrant worker image, . . . though still valid for a minority, is
inappropiate for nine-tenths o f all Chicanos" (Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 108). But, many
o f these Hispanics, although settled, still continued to resort to migratory labor, even if
minimally. A 1973 study o f migrants and settled Hispanics in W ashington found that
63% of the settled ex-migrants still did some fieldwork. Those in urban areas at times
joined others in the fields in order to make extra money. In this case the settled
Hispanic migrants averaged only $3,830 per family compared to $2,760 for those who
continued to m igrate year-round (Gecas 1973, 590).
The impact on small urban areas in Oregon has been dram atic. In the 1980s
seven counties had over 2,500 Chicanos, with the Oregon cities o f Nyssa, W oodburn,
O ntario and Independence leading the way with 40.2%, 18.2%, 13.6% and 17.1%
Hispanic populations (Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 115). During harvest tim e these and
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other small towns bulged with up to three times m ore Hispanics, who m ight some day
settle as well. W oodburn, for example, increased its Hispanic population o f 5,000
year-round to 15,000 during each the summ er (Oregonian 1 D ecem ber 1983, F I).
For many of these migrants who settled out, poverty persisted. Since the 1970s
the family income o f Hispanics in O regon declined. The settled m ade only a little bit
m ore than the migrant, with many still working in the agricultural sector as a perm anent
o r part-tim e employees. In 1984 21% of those Hispanics settled in O regon still w orked
below the poverty line, with 26.4%, com pared to 18.6% Anglos, m aking under $10,000
per year. A nother factor hindered the income and savings o f Hispanics. Hispanics in
Oregon continued to have larger families then Anglos, in part because o f their strong
faith in Catholicism and the machismo value, which stresses that the "man’s worth is
m easured in part by his ability to father children" (Slatta 1979, 160).
While the disadvantages and risks of settling out were great, some studies found
among the settled a slight increase in the education of the parents, a trend towards
sm aller families, a knowledge of the use of farm equipment o r job skills and a slightly
higher income (Gecas 1973; Lagra 1969; Slatta 1979). Some settled w orkers found
economic stability. A total o f 28.3% of the Hispanic families in O regon m ade between
$20,000 and $34,900, com pared to 35.5% of the Anglo families (Slatta 1979, 160).
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CH APTER III

EX TERN A L FACTORS

LOCAL COM M UNITIES

W hile not all Oregonians treated Hispanic migrants unfairly, historically the
reaction o f many was negative. That response ranged from insensitivity to rejection.
Many Oregonians surely preferred a quiet coexistence, but som e vocally and physically
insisted on keeping Hispanics out of their communities and counties once the season
ended. Unfortunately this attitude and action has persisted to the present time.
O ne of the most im portant factors in the fair treatm ent and success of the
migrants was the level of discrimination and intolerance Oregonians displayed.
Oregonians’ history of tolerance has not been strong. Unfortunately, Blacks, Chinese,
Hispanics and other minorities have long been discouraged from settling in Oregon.
During W orld W ar II it was seen as patriotic to hate and m istreat the Japanese
(Gam boa 1984, 22). Later this attitude was extended to the Mexican braceros and
Mexican-American migrants. Although the Japanese and Black workers were generally
denied work because Anglo workers often refused to stay in the same camps with them,
the farm ers of the Northwest accepted braceros because they were cheaper and available
(Gam boa 1984, 3, 22). Although most farm ers wholeheartedly felt that the hiring of
braceros was so good because they would help cut off an agricultural m ovem ent and keep
wages down, it was easy for the farmers to justify their use by a stereotype stated by one
farm er during the 1950s -- that Mexicans were biologically built to be "more adaptable to
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squat labor" (Infante and C urrent 1958,12). The attitude the farm ers held about the
braceros' worth was reflected in the inhumane way in which they cared for them, in the
food and housing, in the horrid work conditions and in the purposeful attem pt to send
them back annually and to keep a new set coming rather than providing a smaller
num ber with year round employment in Oregon.
The braceros and Mexican-Americans, along with other non-Anglos, were banned
from pool halls, movie theaters, beer halls and liquor stores. H ealth authorities’ refusal
to treat the braceros was so widespread that the Office o f Labor took up the issue in
W ashington D.C. An official letter was sent to the health departm ent in Oregon, but
this request did not quell the discrimination. Regardless of whether it was the braceros
themselves they distrusted or their supposed inability to pay for medical fees, the health
authorities’ attitude was blatantly degrading (Gamboa 1984, 173, 181).
Most people wanted nothing to do with the braceros, and to keep them from
visiting their towns, some banned the sale o f liquor on Sunday, specifically because the
braceros would come in on that day (Gamboa 1984, 173; Slatta 1979, 160). Similar to the
harassm ent other minorities received in Oregon, violence was aim ed at the Mexicans.
O ne account tells of the seriousness o f this: In Klamath Falls one bracero was attacked
without provocation, and as he staggered away after the brutal beating he, not his
aggressors, was falsely arrested for drunkenness (Gamboa 1984, 171). Things got so
harsh and disillusionment ran so high during the bracero program th at by 1945 desertion
of the camps by the braceros became a noticeable problem. It was estim ated that five
percent fled the camps and hid in the Chicano community. O thers feigned illness or
declared a family emergency in order to be returned home early (G am boa 1984, 157).
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Most of the farm ers or rural residents never got to know the Hispanic culture
and "probably less even cared." While some of the braceros enrolled in English classes
when they were offered, the farmers m ade no effort to learn Spanish. A nd after the war
farm ers were as "unprepared to relate to the bracero on a personal level as they were
unable to house them adequately" (Gamboa 1984,157). The five percent defection rate,
when braceros hid in the settled Hispanic community, must be seen as a response to the
often brutal and humiliating conditions (Gamboa 1984, 157).
Cultural misunderstanding, ethnocentricity and stereotyping persisted. While the
system of power and politics continued to underrepresent the Hispanic and other
minorities, many Americans scapegoated them for problems o f which they were merely
victims. In W oodburn and Nyssa the school board and city council consistently lacked
representation o f Hispanics, with only one Hispanic sitting on the city council in
W oodburn and none on either the school board or the city council in Nyssa as o f 1985
(M artinis 1987, DIO; Ulrich 1984, C l). Racial tension, police brutality and violence
continue in the small Oregon communities where many Hispanics live (Blackmun 1990;
Browning 1990; Cockle 1990).
Anglo communities tended towards ethnocentricity, feeling intim idated at being
outnum bered or having different cultures surround them (Butterworth 1991, C l).
Agitation among the Anglos rose during the summers when m ore migrants arrived. This
was accentuated by the Anglo communities’ lack of awareness o f Hispanic culture. Just
as once they were term ed educationally retarded by school systems in Oregon, Spanish
speakers were assum ed to be uneducated, ignorant, un-American or illegal (Cargill 1984;
Coonrod 1985; Cowen 1987; Durbin 1981; H ilderbrand 1983).
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A nother example o f this cultural insensitivity and m isunderstanding can be seen
in W oodburn. Although Salud Medical C enter desired to help Anglo and Russian senior
citizens they found that these people would not com e to the clinic because o f the
Mexican m en who congregated in the parking lot. They did not understand that these
m en were not out to intim idate, but just desired to gather as they would in a traditional
plaza in Latin Am erica (M artinis 1987; DIO).
Although the signs declaring "No Mexicans, Blacks or Dogs" no longer hang in
windows and on doors, stereotypes continued. M any believe that the Mexicans were all
on welfare, received governm ent benefits but didn’t pay taxes, and were lazy, alcoholic,
violent and not to be trusted. Their dirt-laden clothes were seen not as a condition of
their work, campsite or poverty, but instead as carelessness (McCarthy 1990, B l). This
was the obvious m isconception when one school adm inistrator and an Oregonian reporter
early in 1960 described m igrant students,
As for cleanliness, some children when they took their first
shower at school required four scrubbings. . . . They
hadn’t known what keeping clean was all about. But once
they caught on . . . they got to like cleanliness. T he idea
snowballed, and some o f their new interest in hygiene even
rubbed off on their parents (W entworth 1960, 3).
Though the attitudes seem ed harm less, in actuality the repercussions were
disasterous. Because an accent was equated with a lack o f education or because all
Hispanics were seen as illegals by some Anglos, they often did not get hired outside of
agriculture (O ta 1983, A l).
This lack o f hiring also occurred because o f the fear by many that the Mexicans
were the ones who took jobs away from Americans. This ignored the fact that many
Hispanics were Am ericans and that the jobs they took often offered less than minimum
wages.
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Instead o f blam ing a whole network, Am ericans pointed the finger at the victim.
If migrants and other Hispanics were taking jobs it was because the economic and
political system allowed and encouraged it. Employers were allowed to pay low wages
and encouraged by the governm ent to obtain foreign labor through governm ent-funded
programs. The governm ent also systematically m aintained lax border patrols and did
little to prevent the use o f illegal aliens. Chicano activists claim ed that these Americans
who pointed the finger needed to look at the fact that Canadians, who w ere never
hassled, more often took the high-paying, skilled jobs in the U nited States (Cowen 1986,
B l).
This cultural m isunderstanding only worsened the treatm ent that Hispanics and
migrants received under the legal system and the by police force. Many Hispanics were
subject to random raids, which occurred increasingly after 1984 because o f the new
immigration law. Many police acted on the assum ption that all Hispanics were possible
illegals. They were not cautious because they didn’t have to worry about the individual
rights of Hispanics who had little political power. This procedure, perform ed by the INS
and the local police forces, did not slacken until a suit was brought against them by a
coalition o f activists and farmers (Oregonian May 6, 1982, B3).
Migrants, along with other Hispanics, experienced injustice under the Am erican
judicial system. U ntil recently, it had been illegal for them to work but not for growers
to hire them. The R everend Richard Knusel, director o f Portland Hispanic Ministry
stated, "in the 10 years I ’ve worked in this state I ’ve practically never seen an
immigration service raid during a harvest season. The raids come before the harvest,
after the harvest or in the middle o f winter, but never during the harvest itself'
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(Kirchm eier 1980, B3). The new law under IRCA rem ained unenforced (McCarthy
1990a, B l).
Discrimination also occurred in the sentencing o f migrants who had committed
crimes. In M ultnomah County incarcerated migrants arrested for m inor drug dealing or
found without documentation, 85% of whom had no prior felony conviction, were
spending significantly m ore time in jail than non-Hispanic criminals committing felonies
(Campillo 1990, B2; M oore 1990, C2 ).
A case that typified the treatm ent of migrants in the legal system concerned a
young man nam ed Santiago Ventura Morales. A rrested, he was tried and found guilty
o f the m urder of another migrant. Several jurors complained o f doubts they had about
the results and the case was publicized. Aside from inappropiate court instructions to
the jurors, other m atters complicated this case. While his court appointed defense
attorney appeared grossly negligent in his effort, the police interrogation rem ained in
question. O ne of the prosecution’s two witnesses, Juan Remegio Estrada, gave a
deposition to V entura’s lawyers in 1991, which stated that Canby police detective
Timothy Skipper coerced false testimony from Estrada. Estrada claimed that Skipper
said, "you’re all drunkards and you’re all bad" (Stanford 1991, C l). Court recordings
imply that racial slurs were made by the judge and defense attorney during the case.
W hat showed further cultural insensitivity and personal negligence was that the case was
heard in English and interpreted in Spanish. V entura was proficient in neither language
since he only spoke an Indian dialect (Ellis 1990, A23). Finally, after spending four
years in jail Ventura was pardoned by Governor Goldschmidt in 1991.
Hispanic distrust of the police forces of local communities has rem ained very
high. The police were seen as insensitive to the culture o f the Hispanics. Verbal or
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body language miscommunication created life threatening situations for the Hispanics
who dealt with the police. Police misjudged latino body language as volatile or defiant.
This resulted in m ore aggressive police responses. O ther stereotypes led police to be
unfairly suspicious and defensive. Hispanics in turn, becam e m ore uncooperative.
During one violent incident in W oodburn there were 60 Hispanic witnesses, but none
would speak to the police (H ilderbrand 1983, B3).
Both the Klamath Falls and W oodburn police forces were accused o f police
brutality, prejudice and cultural insensitivity by Hispanic migrants and perm anent
residents. In both towns unarm ed migrants were killed in the act o f arrest during
non-violent crimes (M anzano 1987, B l; Mayer 1983, MWG1). Few Hispanic police
officers worked in these towns. In 1984 one Spanish-speaking policeman was hired in
W oodburn. Nyssa only had two Hispanic policemen (Cowen 1987a, A l; Ulrich 1984,
C2). Recently, some improvements in police relations were m ade in W oodburn after
community activists insisted on changes, but each step took determ ined grassroots’
pressure (Coonrod 1985, B2).
Unfortunately, tensions have continued to rise. Many migrants began carrying
weapons to protect themselves and establish their own justice since they did not feel that
the police did that for them (Mayer 1983, MWG1). To them, the Am erican police may
not be much different then the dishonest and corrupt police in their own country.

CONTRACTORS

The migrants were in many aspects controlled and m anipulated by a variety of
groups and factors. Throughout the period from 1940 to 1990 little changed in the way
the farm ers and contractors treated the migrants. Contractors were the ones who were
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most closely connected to the m igrants and it is easy to see their effect. They w ere
capable o f doing great service o r great harm to the m igrants. M ost often, while the
fan n er took their profits from the workings o f the contractor, the contractor in turn
squeezed the farmworkers for his profit.
The large landowning farm ers, often organized into associations for recruiting
purposes, relied on the contractors to be their right-hand m en, m anaging the workforce
and thus allowing the farm ers to further remove themselves from direct contact with the
migrants. Most often contractors were used by the larger farms, sugar companies in
eastern Oregon and other food processing companies that purchase entire crops ahead
o f the harvest. With contractors, farm ers could get large num bers o f workers in the field
at the exact time needed. Farm ers kept up-to-date inform ation on contractors so that
companies could wire an agent in another state in the Southwest for labor at any given
time (G am boa 1984, 41).
Many workers discovered that if they were not with a contractor they could not
find as much work because most large farmers preferred to use a contractor because it
freed them from travel and recruitm ent and m anagement responsibilities. In 1961 one
reporter stated, "the labor contractors and their crews always seem to have first choice.
If you are not with a contractor it is difficult to get placed" (Bianco 1961, 21). Small
farm ers didn’t like the contractors because they were m ore expensive than hiring
children, the urban unemployed from skid row, or m igrant families on their own. But,
without a contractor work was not as consistent or as easy to find. Employment without
a contractor lasted a shorter num ber o f days and required m ore travelling to each new
site (Bianco 1962b, 27).
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Contractors were the ones who recruited, hired, supervised and paid the workers
much o f the time. The contractor was most often o f M exican descent, with most
unrelated to their crews. The average age of contractors was 40. T he job was
transitional for many, with their stay in this position averaging five years. Eighty percent
were first generation Mexican-Americans, five percent w ere second generation, with 15%
having lived 10 years in the States. Many spoke both Spanish and English and often
"represents[ed] or co n tro lled ] virtually every phase o f the life o f his crew" (Cowen
1987a, A l; Infante and Current 1958, C2).
While some contractors are part of a family unit and m ake an honest living, with
a few even providing real protection and support, much o f the reporting and studies
done by newspapers and government studies discovered contractors to have been a
corrupt lot working within a powerful hierarchical system (Bianco 1958, Floyd 1968,
Infante and C urrent 1958). In the 1950s the state was divided into territories, run by a
few m en who worked many subcontractors, handling the best farms with the best
earnings and housing, guaranteeing labor to farms, recruiting in the Southwest,
supervising workers, and maintaining, or claiming to m aintain, payroll, tax, and social
security records (Infante and Current 1958, C3). O ne contractor solely controlled a
whole county and another owned 39 vehicles, handling 2,200 workers and 22
subcontractors (Olmos 1970, 8).
Many contractors took advantage of the fact that the migrants didn’t know the
system. A nother contractor helped two men get free health care and then charged them,
telling them he paid for it (Infante and C urrent 1958, C3). Some loaned money at high
interest rates to workers, set up credit in local stores and taverns, and dabbled in
m arkets of prostitution, drugs and gambling. Contractors were also known to force local
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businessmen to pay a percentage o f the amount spent in their business by the migrants.
W hen one grocer refused to go along with this "deal" the contractors involved m ade sure
that no one shopped there, bringing his profits down 90% (Bianco 1958b, 1). Some even
paid them their wages in a tavern where they would proceed to spend it. The 1958
Bureau o f L abor report stated:
There appears to be a hierachy of powerful contractors who
coordinate the criminal slideline of the subcontractor . . .
punish[ing] those who do not su b m it.. . . This is not a
hastily contrived pattern . . . but r a th e r . . . well
coordinated by a few people. There can be little doubt that
the present contractors are a factor in suppressing the
progress o f the Spanish American migrant farmworker
towards full citizenship and Americanization. There can be
little doubt that these social conditions are a threat to the
health of the communities and the agricultural industry, as
well (Infante and Current 1958, C9).
It is interesting to note that this report by Infante was adamantly denied by growers’
leagues and associations.
M any accounts of unethical recruiting and false promises and record keeping
continued to be reported. Contractors paid their workers less than they earned, keeping
the rest for themselves. The state Human Rights Advisoiy Council was told of recruiting
in New Mexico with ads promising "free child care services, payment for transportation
cost, pay advances upon arrivals, use of surplus foods and a guarantee of 3 months work."
Similarly, posters promised free doctors, nurses, hospital care, dentist and daycare
centers. In this case, when workers arrived farmers referred them to the community
public health and child care agencies (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969, 10; Rural
Tribune Septem ber 1978, 1). A study of 100 migrants reported 90% o f them stating that
they were cheated by employers on payroll deductions (Cowen 1987a, A l).
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With the heavy recruiting in the Southwest, many of the workers sought after
were non-farmworkers who, unaware of the realities, could be easily convinced to join
because o f the wonderful advantages and offerings. O ther cases included recruitm ent o f
illegal migrants, bringing workers in weeks early to keep the wages down, supplying credit
and then forcing them to work a lower wage than either first told or set by the
government (Chan 1990; Infante and Current 1958; Stein 1990). In one case, a
M edford-area contractor never paid them any wages at all (H am ilton 1990, C3).
Contractors set up a system o f dealing with those who tried to get out from under
them: taking away registration papers; threatening to turn in illegals; loaning money;
getting workers drunk or loaded on marijuana; blacklisting them; o r warning that he
would tell o th er workers that the migrant was a government inform er (Bianco 1962;
Infante and C urrent 1958; Ham ilton 1990; Stein 1990).
Laws regulating contractors remain lenient. Oregon statutes did not m ake any
distinction between contractors and crewleaders, allowing for loopholes. Contractors
were required only to register with the state, while crewleaders registered with the federal
government. No written contracts were required and thus there was little way to enforce
agreements. Inspections were rare and little verification was ever dem anded to show that
these contractors were paying for social security for the wages o f his employees or
providing old age, survivors’ and disability insurance as required.
In 1989 the regulations on contractors were tightened. A fter the enactm ent of
IRCA, which specifically limited funded services to legally docum ented workers, local
clergy, health workers and government officials clamped down on contractors. They
insisted that legal m easures be taken so that contractors were required to begin providing
housing and food for their workers who were being recruited early and were forced to go
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without food or a place to lodge. Contractors must now provide those services until the
jobs are available. Enforcem ent, however, is still minimal (Blackmun 1990, 4M EP8).

N A TION AL A G R IC U LTU R A L TR EN D S

Ultim ately, the economic system functioning in the U nited States has created
unstable and fluctuating economic conditions that have required low-paying m igrant
labor. The churnings of the capitalist system, founded on private property and
com petition for land and money, is reflected in the treatm ent and conditions o f the
Hispanic and other farmworkers. With profit as the goal, exploitation o f labor has
resulted. Fluctuations in the m arket due to overproduction, expansion and consolidation
have caused great pain for farmworkers and for the small farm ers who often employed
them.
This trend of development began in the late 1800s. As the economy and position
o f farm ers and farm laborers continued to change, the employer-employee relationship
becam e increasingly impersonal, and the worker, unable to obtain farm ownership,
suffered a low status in society, inducing many to m igrate to the cities (Feise 1978).
It must be stated that the system at work, which encourages both the
accumulation o f land and wealth and competition between those trying to accum ulate
wealth, creates within agribusiness a fierce struggle for survival, especially am ong those at
the bottom. C orporate farms producing food at lower costs in Third W orld countries
added another level o f competition (Hightower 1973, 80). And as the large farm ers
continued to strengthen and develop, they dom inated small farm and farm w orker
interests when it came to influencing government policy making. Agricultural workers
and small farm ers found they could not depend on equal government support. Even
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government support intended for the struggling farm ers often ended up in the hands o f
those most capable o f controlling political power -- the large farm ers o r investors, who
lobbied for increasing government aid that directly helped them while hurting the small
farm ers and farmworkers.
U nder this system, accumulation o f private property on a large scale accelerated
during the G ilded Age, a time of graft and corruption. Between 1862 and 1891 the
governm ent sold m ore land than was hom esteaded, which led to massive land speculation
and m onopolization,". . . contrary to the expectation of the dem ocratic forces that had
fought for free homesteads" (Feise 1978, 79).
As the decades passed, with each new economic depression, m ore and m ore small
and average farm ers could not sustain their incomes, selling out to those who had surplus
capital to hold them over. The government and banks participated in this by foreclosing
on those who could not pay taxes or loan payments.
In addition this large-scale emphasis has hurt small farm ers by further increasing
costs, making banks finance the bigger, "low risk" farms, which in turn has forced m ore
specialization, which again in turn has led to the processor biting off a bigger chunk of
profit. M ore recently, along with large farms loaded with government aid, natural
elem ents, intrusion on land base by surburbia and increased taxes has caused further
dam age to small farms (Young and Caday 1979, 23). The end result can be seen by the
drop in the num ber o f farms in the U nited States from 6,812 million to 2,786 million
from 1935 and 1976 (Feise 1978, 79).
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T H E O R EG O N ECONO M Y

Before 1930 Oregon farmers experienced the same regular slumps and periods of
prosperity that farm ers throughout the nation did. In the west, land rem ained for a
longer tim e cheaper and m ore available, with the same speculation trends occurring a
few decades later. Small, self-sufficient farming prevailed, with larger-scale production
beginning at the turn o f the century when the railway and other transportation systems
cam e to the Pacific Northwest (Blok 1974, 10).
In the 1930s the Depression, similar in consequences to the other slumps before
it, hit Oregon hard. For example, Oregon farm ers’ inability to pay taxes led to the
repossession of 1,150,000 rural acres in 1930 and 1,778,273 acres in 1936 (com pared to
alm ost none in 1915) (Gamboa 1984, 32). These lands were incorporated into larger
farms, which were successful because they could expand or alter their crops as necessary
(Blok 1974, 111).
For those who survived the 1930s the two following decades were prosperous.
T he wartim e dem and for food led to the rise in agricultural production. Now, the
farm ers had another sort o f problem. The labor reserve that had existed during the
D epression disappeared with labor shortages in the Pacific Northwest reaching a greater
crisis point than nationally because o f Oregon’s record production. As in other parts of
the nation, Anglo workers headed for the shipyards and aircraft factories, which in the
Northwest was centered in Seattle, Portland and Vancouver. Worsening the agricultural
labor shortage, the production increase in sugar beets, suddenly m ore profitable with
new protection from tariffs, required trem endous amounts o f labor, needed twice a year
in eastern Oregon. The farmers were at a loss; they could no longer rely on the Anglos
who could turn to government work projects or the war effort instead of the low wages
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the farmers offered. The 1937 Sugar Act which prohibited children under the age o f 14
from working, and children between the age o f 14 and 16 from working m ore than 8
hours a day, further worsened the labor shortage.
By the end o f the 1950s a different kind of crunch occurred, setting trends that
have lasted to the present. Land prices, taxes and the cost o f m aintaining the new larger
farm took their toll. With the introduction o f chemicals, fertilizer and pesticides, costs
skyrocketed. In Oregon, the percentage o f the total costs of farm ing required by
m echanization jum ped 24% for Oregon farmers between 1950 and 1966, while the use of
fertilizer increased 375% (Fabiyi 1969, 51). And, nationally betw een 1965 and 1975 the
substitution o f capital for labor climbed 300% (Feise 1978, 72).
Thus, the need for a large labor force slowed as m echanization took its place,
even if at a little slower pace than elsewhere in the nation, although in Oregon snap
beans, strawberries, cherries, and pears would remain, much to the dismay o f the
farm ers, persistently labor-intensive. During the 1950s and 1960s the use o f labor by
farm ers dropped around 36%, with labor as a percentage o f farm ers’ costs falling from
40% to 19%. Production per-m an-hour also increased trem endously between 1950 and
1966, with vegetable production rising 74%, fruit production 23% and feed grains 300%
(Oregon Governor Task Force 1969, 1).
This search for labor-saving, or as farmers felt m ore com fortable putting it,
cost-saving, devices, on which the government spent so much tim e and money, worsened
the plight of all but the large farmer. The kind of research prioritized was geared
towards the larger farm, remaining unaffordable and inefficient for middle-sized and
small farms. Sm aller farms, unable to compete, found it harder and harder to survive.
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W hen some chose to expand to keep up they often encountered an indebtedness they
never imagined.
This was a time o f continued consolidation, with many small farm ers falling by
the wayside. T here seem ed no other option, either expand o r leave th e m arket. Oregon
farms fell in num ber from 63,000 to 43,000 between 1950 and 1966. B oth the acreage
and the num ber o f farm ers declined, although the average farm grew 150 acres between
1950 and 1960 and the total production increased 19% between 1958 and 1968 (Fabiyi
1969, 30; O regon G overnor’s Task Force 1969, 1).
For those who did expand to survive, the bank, the processor, and other
m iddlem en in this increasingly specialized kind of farm ing became m ore and m ore
controlling, setting requirem ents and taking a huge profit, especially in the refinancing o f
loans. In Oregon in the 1960’s farm ers only received 50% of the price paid by retailers
(Oregon G overnor’s Task Force 1969, 1). Thus, while productivity increased, m ore
farms collapsed and the exploitation o f labor continued to rise, allowing for the largest
farms to reap a greater profit and invest in the cheap land of bankrupted farm ers.
To further complicate m atters, the debts that smaller farm ers acquired in order
to buy this labor-saving, production-increasing equipm ent forced growers to try to cut
costs even m ore in other ways, and the labor variable continued to be their easiest
choice. As well, for all farm ers the unpredictability o f the Northwest w eather and its
effect on the farm ers’ harvest required the need for short-term surplus labor. Though
the farmers might agree that a perm anent labor force would be better for the migrants,
they could not afford to m ake this their responsibility (Interview. Jack C orbett 1990).
The large farms, m ore often family-owned than corporate farm s in Oregon, raced
further and further away from the rest o f the pack. A study o f the W illam ette Valley in
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the 1970s showed this trend. Farm ers in this region with over 500 acres o f land
increased nearly three times, from 12 to 43 farms, while farm ers with over 2,000 acres
m ultiplied ninefold, from two to 18 farms between 1930 and 1970 (V an O tten 1978, 156).
By the 1960s these top O regon farmers made the public believe that all farm ers were
doing well because the large farmers represented wealth and power. In 1969, farmers
were valued at 500 million dollars annually, and ranked as the second largest industry in
Oregon. As well, Oregon ranked fifth in the use of migrant labor in the country
(O regon G overnor’s Task Force 1969, 1).
Initially the 1970’s looked like they would be good to m ore farm ers. A growth in
exports from global demand, coupled with the decline o f the U.S. dollar, caused a rise in
prices and led farmers, with the banks’ encouragement, to see wisdom in expanding their
size. But then, nationally land prices shot higher than inflation, taxes surged and the
farm real estate debt tripled. The farmers were by now in seemingly irreversible debt
(Somm ers 1988, 54).
Consum ers also began to demand that farmers drop their prices, eventually
boycotting m eat. More farm ers went under, while those who rem ained converted to less
labor-intensive crops and again tried to reduce the only cost they felt they had control
over, labor (Sommers 1988, 54).
By the late sixties, much of the labor in Oregon was foreign and undocumented,
which satisfied the farm ers because few regulations covered them, and, out of fear of
being deported, they were less likely to complain (Galarza 1964; R obertson 1969). The
recesssion during the 1970s in the Southwest had pushed m ore Mexican-Americans who
had tried their luck at other jobs to return to migrant labor, which allowed the farmers
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to keep the wages extremely low (Wells 1976, 268). Small farmers, who couldn’t afford
the expensive machinery, relied heavily on the cheap migrant labor.
In the 1980’s unfavorable conditions continued. Many large investors moved out
o f the agricultural sector and into the industrial sector or exported their capital to the
T hird W orld. The expansion of the foreign m arket for agricultural products from .57 to
23 billion dollars between 1969 and 1976 reflected this trend (Feise 1978, 100). The
global dem and that seem ed so sure dropped, and while prices and real interest rates
stayed up land value fell. Then, lenders, who assessed land values as constituting 75% of
the total farm assets, backed off on giving m ore or renewed loans, and m ore small and
middle-sized farms collapsed (Sommers 1988, 54). While a few small farm ers developed
a new philosophy on surviving, most middle-sized and small farmers, having attem pted to
expand, continued to struggle desperately. The fact that many have stayed in farming
attests m ore to small farm ers’ commitment to their way o f life and livelihood than to
their desire for profit (Young and Caday 1979, 16).

O R EG O N FARM ERS

Profile
Oregon farmers as a group represented wealth and power. And yet, despite all
o f this, approximately 80% of the farmers in Oregon rem ained deeply in debt, with many
o f them declaring bankruptcy each year, followed by consolidation of land by the larger
farms o r real estate investors, industry or sprawling suburbs. Between 1950 and 1960
alone the num ber o f farms declined from 63,000 to 43,000 (Fabiyi 1969, 24). This large
percentage o f small farmers, each grossing less than $40,000 a year, grew 15% o f
O regon’s farm produce, did much of the labor themselves and hired farmworkers for a
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short period o f time each year (Young 1982, 209). Because small farm ers lacked
resources, however, they did not have access to as much machinery as the larger farms
and thus used a far greater percentage o f farmworkers than the larger farms. Their
economic condition directly affected their ability to offer proper housing and fair wages
to workers.
Social factors also played into the farm ers’ treatm ent o f the workers. The
preconceived ideas farm ers held o f the workers and the lack o f direct contact with them
because of the use o f contractors often allowed small and large farmers alike to be
unconcerned. But, economic conditions created the strongest responses. As the small
farm er continued to struggle, and the larger farm er profit, farmworker conditions
rem ained a low priority.
One study in 1977 in Polk County found that, on the average, small farm ers
received annual government aid equalling twenty dollars. In a 1974 study done on the
small farm ers of the W illamette Valley, the total gross income averaged was $12,419 with
the gross income from product sales $1,230. Fifty-four percent o f these farm ers reported
losses after calculating their net incomes (Blok 1974, 111). Forty-six percent in Oregon
worked over 100 days outside o f their farms, and in one study o f Polk County small
farm ers 33% held full time jobs while many of their spouses also worked part-tim e
(Young and Caday 1979, 17). In 1978 a study in W ashington County found 50% o f the
1,090 farms there grossed less than $2500 the previous year. A few farm ers thrived while
the rest crept along. One hundred thirty-one sold over $100,000 that sam e year (Rural
Tribune August 1978, 1). Small farms continue to struggle for their survival, selling land,
taking losses, or foreclosing. Many of those who did not foreclose tried to expand,
leasing up to 55% of the land they farm ed (Blok 1974,156; Van O tten 1978, 63).
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Although they watched the farm they grew up on crumbling, they rem ained rooted in the
belief that it was the only way o f life (Young 1982, 209).

Political Actions o f Oregon Farmers
Farm ers, united in growers’ leagues, societies and associations often controlled by
the larger farm ers, lobbied and conferred in order to create a profitable environm ent for
themselves. For example, the Oregon H orticultural Society, the states’ oldest and largest
agricultural organization, regularly lobbied in W ashington for the farm ers. Many
associations in the Northwest were set up in the 1930s for the purpose of stopping
communist and radical "agitators" (G am boa 1984, 333). They attem pted to m aintain a
surplus labor m arket to keep wages low and prevent unionism, to secure governm ent aid,
to keep unwanted laws from being passed while keeping the enforcem ent o f existing
restrictions lax, to replace disruptive government officials or discourage m eddling
volunteers, and to prom ote a positive image to the public and the government.
In order to m aintain a positive image farm ers often sought the use o f the press,
and warned that this law or that dem and from the migrants would force them under,
push prices up or destroy small farm ers and let big out-of-state corporations take over.
In some cases farm ers feared that the profit margin would decline if a particular bill was
passed. But small farm ers would have been better off in the long run if they had not
allowed the large farm ers to regularly speak for them and prom ote large farm interests
as their own.
Since the early 1900s, Oregon farm ers pushed the government to help them .
After 1900 farm ers’ associations organized into granges, alliances and farm bureaus,
lobbied for improving the state o f O regon’s roads. The Grange also actively involved
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itself by pushing for agricultural education and research funded by the government
through county fairs and state horticultural societies (Blok 1974, 1)
Usually the farmers preferred that the governm ent take a hands-off approach to
m ost issues concerning the migrants unless they were being pressured to do something
themselves, and this attitude hurt the migrants tremendously. If pressured, however,
farm ers dem anded that the government fund any improvement in the m igrants’
conditions, refusing to take responsibility themselves. T he large farm ers, who could have
afforded to house and pay farmworkers better, m anipulated the plight of the small
farm ers by saying that it was the state of all farmers, justifying their position by claiming
that they couldn’t afford these costs and thus couldn’t m ake improvements either. The
following statem ent of one Oregon farm er is representative o f those found regularly in
the press: "If anybody is poorer than we are, I ’d like to see them" (Oim os 1968c, 27).
The use o f we lumped all farmers together in the public eye, discouraging any knowledge
o f the division between small and large farms. A nother example was when activists
organized a "Poor People’s March" which should have included small farm ers. But, the
plight o f the small farmer was used to destroy the purpose o f this march, as one farm er
reported to the press that he was against "this march thing" because the governm ent will
get "too tough" with the small farm er and then "food prices will really go up" (Olmos
1968c, 27).
In reality, many small farmers saw corporate farm ers as different from
themselves. T heir distrust was directed towards the large farms and the governm ent who
combined, it seem ed, to the small farmer, to work hand in hand (Young and Caday
1979, 14). In fact, many small farmers perceived the governm ent as one o f their main
problem s, or put more clearly, as one of their main enemies. The small farm ers’ lack of
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power or voice, however, left them no option but to go along with the growers’ leagues,
hoping that som e o f the farm lobby gains would help the small farm er as well.
A nother approach the farmers took was to lobby for those governmment officials,
politicians or activists who aided them and to oppose those whom they saw as disruptive.
A fine example o f this was the national battle that took place between the conservative
Am erican Farm Bureau Federation and liberal New Deal politicians in the USDA and
the FSA in the 1940s. Though it is an early example it is useful in its representation of
the farm lobby’s tactics. Like others around the nation, the N W Farm News encouraged
farm ers to write congress opposing the New Deal "radical FSA policies" that would have
set a minimum wage and other labor conditions for the farmworker as well as
rehabilitation programs for the small farmer. The association was very aware that these
rehabilitation program s would have kept the small farm ers from being low wage earners.
N ot only did the farm ers prevent such legislation, they also succeeded in getting
Roosevelt to transfer the responsibility to the m ore conservative WPA and to weaken
the FSA by slashing its appropiations to 70% (Gamboa 1984, 87).
This kind of unification occurred in 1970 when the potato farm ers gathered in
Klamath county as a growers’ league to dem and that the local Council o f Churches
volunteer group cease its investivation o f migrants’ working conditions. Claiming the
volunteers had "caused us quite a bit of trouble," their representative went on to say:
"We’ve never been happy with the Council o f Churches. It has seem ed more interested
in bettering the laborers’ social standards than their religious needs" (Austermann 1970,
31).
The farm ers could destroy a politician’s or a government official’s career, as they
did with Bureau of Labor D irector M arcontonio Infante’s when he began speaking up in
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an alm ost m ilitant fashion for the migrants and the conditions the farm ers continued to
impose on them, coming out with an inflammatory report that the press picked up in
1958. The Fruit Growers’ League o f Jackson County dem anded to the state and to the
politicians that he be fired, and that the report be withdrawn from the public libraiy.
And, as if that wasn’t enough, they fram ed him on trum ped up drug lord charges which
they circulated in the press. In the end, one o f the few government employed advocates
for m igrant labor was taken out of office (Bianco 1962c, 23).
But, one may ask, how could these farm ers act this way? Partially, the drive for
money and power is at fault, but the farm ers’ perspective also added and still adds to
their ability to believe what they are doing is right. G am boa states that the farm ers of
the 1940s and 1950s, "although conscious o f their treatm ent o f the Mexican and
M exican-American workers, cared more about production and profits and less about
hum an value" (Gam boa 1984, 3). The m ore removed a farm er is from his workers or
the workplace, the more out of touch he is with the reality o f the w orkers’ conditions or
his impact on those conditions. His awareness of the conditions and his impact on them
becomes in his memory more and more vague as he distances himself. It makes it easier
for him to wash his hands of guilt and rely on stereotypes about the migrant, making it
seem as though it’s as much the fault of the migrants as his fault.
As the following example so clearly shows, the farm ers’ insights lose a sense of
reality about these people they are so directly connected to: O ne writer for the N W
Farm News wrote in the 1940s:
Contrary to the morbid story told by John Steinbeck in
G rapes of Wrath, harvesting the vegetables and fruits of
Oregon is an aspiring industry. T here’s the job o f being in
the out-of-doors; working at top efficiency in the cool of
the morning and slowing to a m ore languid pace as the
noon sun warms the back and relaxes the spirit. T here’s
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joy in handling the ripe round fruit either picking or
packing pears, apples and prunes (Gam boa 1984, 242).
Instead o f facing the fact that most of the housing and w ork conditions they
provided for the workers were inhumane, some farm ers felt that m igrants deserved or
should get by with that which was no better than what they had had in Mexico, claiming
that if they replaced or improved it, the migrants would only ruin it again (Gamboa
1984, 333).
The farm ers wanted the government to aid the migrants only as long as the
control rem ained in their hands. This was often achieved through the use o f the state
extension service, which the farm ers’ associations controlled. D uring the bracero
program, the boards set up to determ ine wages were controlled by the extension services
and therefore the wages that farm ers offered were often autom atically accepted
(Gamboa 1984, 234). Although occasionally the farm ers dem anded the state to solve,
for example, the problem of migrant housing, they did not want governm ent camps to
return for fear of creating a meeting place for "radicals," which they believed they saw
happening in the 1930s and 1940s. After the bracero program the farm ers bought out
the government camps, tore them down and replaced them with private camps which
they could control m ore effectively. And the end result was that housing prices doubled
for the migrants while the upkeep decreased (Gamboa 1984, 333). In reality, however,
farmers may have actually worked against their own profit by not providing conditions
that would prom ote commitment, dedication and harder work.
As stated before, farmers felt an urgent need to do whatever possible to
m anipulate and control the labor supply in order to keep wages low, using early
recruitment, contractors, illegal aliens, government aid, and even scare tactics to prevent
demands from the workers.
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Farm ers wanted to keep union activity from taking off, especially because they
had seen the effects in California, and to a lesser extent in eastern Washington, both
during the 1930s and 1940s and during the late 1960s with Cesar Chavez. They kept the
labor reserve high with early recruitm ent and the use first o f the braceros, urban
teenagers, and then illegal aliens. The use o f the braceros was detrim ental to any
improvement in the wages and conditions o f M exican-American and Anglo migrants, as
the farm ers were well aware. From 1941 to 1950 wages went down 11% for farmworkers
even while the cost o f living went up 23%. And while industrial wages dropped 34%
farm wages slid 51%. N either were benefits like those in the industrial sector gained
(Gamboa 1984, 349).
When the farm ers didn’t like the contract they were forced to abide by under the
bracero program, they did whatever they could to change it, such as they did when hiring
a lawyer to change the provisions limiting braceros "to maintaining the work contract,"
which was vague enough to lead to the interpretation that they could not join unions
(Galarza 1964, 46). They encouraged racial tensions, kicking out the Anglo migratory
workers when the braceros arrived and later segregating the migrants in the camps
(Gamboa 1984). O ther times they set up false advertising in order to m aintain a high
reserve. One strong example o f this occurred in 1957 when there had been a lot of labor
unrest among the migrants. The following year workers were purposely recruited seven
weeks early and encouraged to run up a bill at the grocery store. Then the wage was
dropped, forcing them to work at a very low one (Infante and Current 1958, C7).
The farmers used the legislature to control labor as well. N ot only did they stall
many bills that would have restricted farmers, they also pushed through very biased laws,
such as the anti-picketing law in 1969 (K adera 1969b, 39). Any time these laws were
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questioned, associations would arrive in Salem to stress their burden. In 1971, when the
anti-picketing law was discussed, representatives from the Oregon Agricultural
Association and the O regon Farm Bureau joined the Oregon H op Growers claiming that
they couldn’t afford strikes because o f the vulnerability o f the crop (Hughes 1963, 9;
Oregonian, 27 April 1971, 2). Examples o f lobbying by farm groups to block legislative
action occurred on several occasions. Regularly they lobbied to prevent attem pts to
strengthen farm camp regulations in Oregon. They complained o f VISTA and other
government workers’ efforts to improve conditions, resulting in the cancellation of
funded projects. Farm associations united to stop IRCA and to halt raids conducted by
the INS during the harvest season (Gamboa 1984; Hill 1982; Hogan 1982).
In an effort to prevent this inevitable labor unrest many farmers employed arm ed
guards and demanded police support while lobbying the government for help in
advancing more research on labor-saving machinery to help them elim inate the whole
problem o f acquiring workers (Oregonian, 2 August 1970, 38). One statem ent m ade in
1971 by an owner of a 250 acre farm in Nyssa, after four Office o f Equal Opportunity
(O EO ) workers-activists were fired, clarified the farm ers’ main tactics:
Each year each grower puts up several hundreds o f dollars
to bring farmworkers here and to help operate the
workers’ camps, but this year some of us are going to put
the money into development of an onion combine . . .
reduce the need for farmworkers. W e’re small operators
and just can’t stand the ruckus of strikes and strike threats
each year" (Guernsey 1971, 1). And another farm er in
Nyssa stated during one of the many periods of labor
unrest, "We raised our right arm and swore that from now
on any crop we plant has to be picked with machinery or
can walk on and off a truck (Oregonian July 7,1970, 14).
And with government aid in research, the threat was real.
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W hen the workers did strike, farm ers might merely starve them out o f the camps
until they returned to work, ship a few out, or have some jailed for trespassing or
disorderly conduct (Gam boa 1984, 246).
But most importantly, farm ers tried to avoid this by doing alm ost anything,
except improve conditions, to m aintain large num bers through early recruitm ent,
deceptive attractions and government programs which allowed for a surplus o f labor like
Public Law 78. The President o f the Jackson County Fruit Growers League in 1963
clarified with this declaration,
O ur growers have time and time again, in fact for 20 years,
proven that there are just not enough domestic workers
available to harvest the crop . . . and to shut off the
bracero program will hold thousands o f workers in Mexico
in a position o f poverty, and that it may very well stim ulate
Communist activity (Bianco 1963a, 15).
O ne might question w hether the treatm ent o f the migrants by Oregon farm ers wouldn’t
have "stimulated communism" nearly as much.
But farmers did not see things in this light. The Japanese, teenagers, a
"Woman’s Army," and then the braceros were summoned to work the fields. Everything
was done to prevent a shortage which might provide the workers the m eans to dem and
better wages and conditions. And when the bracero program ended, farm ers again
pooled their efforts, recruiting and advertising for workers out o f state, hiring
contractors or agreeing upon certain levels o f wages they were willing to pay that
particular year. Recruitm ent was intensified so much that contractors began convincing
Southwest Hispanics who did not usually m igrate to begin. They offered steady jobs,
m odern housing and high wages. O ne year eight farmers were tried and convicted o f
deceitful recruiting in Texas and New Mexico (Oregonian, 7 July 1970,14). In 1978 500
migrant workers joined in a class action suit against the Tankersley brothers. They
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charged fraud, false advertising, breach of contract and m inimum wage violations. The
ads listed in New Mexico and Texas recruited Hispanics who had never worked migrant
labor before by offering $35 a day, three months o f work seven days a week, quality
housing with indoor hot water, color television, basketball courts, and washing machines.
The ads also prom ised transportation to local stores. T he reality turned out to be far
from the offering. W ith the help o f the Migrant Legal A id Project in Clackamas
County, the migrants won this suit (Rural Tribune Septem ber 1978,1). But, labor unrest
continued and was on the rise again in the 1980s. Farm ers can m erely reminisce about
the tim e they had so much m ore control as one did by saying, "it hasn’t been the same
since the bracero program" (Kirchm eier 1980, B3).

TH E GO VERNM EN T

Policies
The American political and legal system did not h ear all m em bers in society
equally. It is those who had the expertise, political contacts, and money who influenced
those making government policy. In this case, the large land owning farm ers dominated.
Many representatives of the government justified this support for the large land
owning farm ers by believing that it was in the best interest o f the health o f the state and
agricultural economy. The government believed that if the farm ers profited then
Oregonians and migrants profited and attem pted to help all three by providing aid to the
farm ers. Migrants were generally aided only when the governm ent was pressured by
citizens united in groups or when the farmers dem anded it in o rder to avoid taking on
the economic responsibility themselves. That same concern for a healthy economy kept
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those few laws enacted which aided the poor farm ers o r farmworkers void o f any solid
"legal teeth" (O regon Governor’s Task Force 1969,1).
Public sympathy for the nostalgic past o f the Am erican farm er trying to carve out
the A m erican dream further heightened the governm ent’s efforts to help the farm er.
Form er G overnor o f Oregon Tom McCall reflected on this when he wrote in his 1969
study, "Mexican-American and White migrants need special attention, but growers and
processors also have problems" (Oregon Governor’s Task Force 1969, 2).
This leniency towards regulating farms in reality did not help the farm ers who
really needed it. Instead government policies continued to assist the large farmowners,
creating price supports and a tax structure which led to a regressive redistribution of
income, raised food prices for the American public between 10% and 20% and gave
substantial federal gifts to property owners. One example of this was seen in 1967 under
the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. Fifty percent of the payments
went to eight percent of producers and nine percent o f the payments went to 50% of the
producers (Milk 1972, 23).
A nother philosophical factor played into the motives behind what the
governm ent chose to do. Very clearly, helping some farm ers earn a significant profit
margin was a higher priority than trying to create employment and a livelihood for large
num bers o f people. The "trickle-down theory" was in effect. In 1972 for example 750
million dollars were spent on production research. In 1969, 6,000 man/years o f research
in experim ent stations were funded with only 289 o f those, less than five percent, aimed
at "people-oriented research" (Hightower 1973, 1,6). This attem pt, which specifically
benefited large farms, was funded by public taxes, including those of the struggling
farm er (Hightow er 1973; Milk 1972).
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It is not surprising, then, to find that the government, as a whole, did not create
laws and restrictions to allow for the small land owning farmers or the migrants to have
an equal standing with the large farm holders. While the larger land owning farm ers,
who lobbied long and hard, were seen as an im portant link in O regon’s prosperity, the
small land owning farm ers were encouraged to abandon farming and pushed into the
urban areas while the migrants rem ained, in the eyes o f the government, cheap labor and
an economic burden (O regon Governor’s Task Force 1969). Ignored and invisible,
migrants crowded "into shacks in rural areas, hidden from public view." Legislators and
activists fought an impossible battle trying to allocate money to those who supposedly
didn’t exist (Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1).
The plight o f the migrants was not helped since they were seen as one of the
m ajor expenses, and therefore troubles, of the small farmer, who was already in
economic trouble. T he cost of migrant labor, instead of the economic system o r the
result of previous government actions, became the scapegoat for the collapse o f the
small farmer. When they were not seen as the blame, the transient m igrant workers
were still not an issue the government felt it had to contend with, especially for
politicians who saw them , in particular in later years, not only as a racial minority but
also as largely foreign-born. Since migrants did not have the power to pull political
strings, they could be safely ignored (Hightower 1973; Jack Corbett, personal interview, 8
August 1990; Tom ar 1988).
A nother belief reinforced the lack of incentive the government held in helping
migrants, and more specifically Hispanic migrants. While Anglo m igrant workers were
given infrequent opportunities through government programs before and during the
recovery of the economy after the Depression o f the 1930s, the government most often
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saw the Hispanic migrants as a perm anent, impoverished group, incapable o f being
helped. No land grants, farm aid or settlem ent efforts were offered to Hispanic migrants
as they were to the others during the New Deal. And no effort was m ade to understand
or m ake adjustments to the varying culture o f these Am ericans, whom they often
considered outsiders (Gam boa 1984, 3, 131). This further reduced any effectiveness the
governm ent had when it instituted policies to provide for the migrants.
The message the government received as to what the farm ers needed came
alm ost solely from the large farm owners. The wealthy farm ers, and businessmen
representing farm interests, led the farm bureaus, the agricultural councils, the m arketing
cooperatives and the college extension complex (Oregonian, 10 April 1973, 22)
Organizations lobbied through "a network of private and semi-official users’ committees,
county and state advisory boards and employment services" (Hawley 1966, 163).
Rural congressmen who came from politically safe, one-party districts and who
often supported the farm lobby had by the 1950s accum ulated senority, placing them in
key com m ittee chairmanships in Capitol Hill. These rural representatives and senators
were often assigned to agricultural committees, insuring that "farm pressure groups
receive[d] a highly favorable hearing" (Hawley 1966, 164).
The result in many rural areas was an axis of power that
ran from the growers’ organizations to the processing
companies to the local chambers of commerce, and it was
only natural that local officials, county agents and state
adm inistrators should go along with the established order,
especially when it was reinforced by rural
over-representation and backed by the conservative
orientation o f most o f the agricultural colleges and state
farm agencies (Hawley 1966, 163).
The forming of the Commission on Agricultural W orkers is an example of
farm ers and representatives of farm organizations being regularly assigned positions on
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government agencies, comm ittees and bureaus, and thus the biased support government
gave to large farm interests. This commission, formed under the Im m igration Reform
and Control Act o f 1986, held the responsibility o f assessing w hether agriculture should
continue to remain outside the realm o f m odern labor-m anagem ent techniques, given
special attention by the government in finding labor sources, and be void o f the
regulations o f the National Labor Relations Act (Hancock 1990, B7). Typically, its
twelve m em bers represented almost solely the farm ers’ perspective, with seven being
large farm growers o r representing grower organizations. O n the o ther hand only one
m em ber was a labor representative and none were Hispanic (H ancock 1990, B7).
State legislators, heavily lopsided in their alignment with the farm lobby, carefully
directed any funding that did come the way of migrants. If an agency did not spend
monies as deem ed appropiate, its program would be discontinued. In 1979 Oregon
Rural Opportunities, a non-profit agency, got so frustrated with this that they
successfully sued the U.S. D epartm ent o f Labor for its loss o f money without apparent
reason (Rural Tribune January 1979, 1).
The government also poured money into the research complex and set up
legislation to maintain labor as it best benefited these farm ers. P.L. 78 served this
purpose during the 1950s and 1960s while the Imm igration Reform and Control Act
fulfilled the same during the 1980s. Lax border patrols and INS raids occurring after the
harvest allowed farmers cheap labor. Within this effort to aid the farm ers the
government also purposely aimed to destroy unionization, consequently elim inating the
chance for improvement for the migrants. W hen the 1969 O regon G overnor’s Task
Force wrote in its R eport to the Governor that "the danger o f unionization is not very
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great," the implication was that unions were a destructive force to be prevented (Oregon
Governor’s Task Force 1969, 2).
G overnm ent funded agricultural research began in 1887. This ran under a state
agricultural college system through the Hatch Act, and after 1914 via the D epartm ent of
A griculture’s Cooperative Extension Service. The agricultural extension colleges
attem pted to reduce the migrant problem by minimizing the need for migrants, driving
ahead at full force to invent mechanization (Hightow er 1973; Milk 1972). T he thust of
the research was to perfect specialized, one-crop production, hybrid crops picked by
m achine, rather than self-sufficient farming. The research complex envisioned large
farm s as perfection. This effort proved successful, eliminating the need for many of the
m igrants while destroying small, labor-intensive farms. Though not everyone supported
this vision o f the government, those who had the most money, resources and power
becam e the loudest and directed this push along. W hether this was ultimately "success"
for Oregonians is altogether another question (Blok 1974; Van O tten 1978; Young and
Caday 1979). Critics claimed that the research complex misspent the public’s investment
for the needs o f the average farm er, "undertaken with a focus on profit, without concern
for those hurt, and . . . accountable only to private interests" (Feise 1978, 5).
This agricultural research complex also participated directly in finding the easiest
ways for farm ers to solve their labor problems, allowing them to avoid dealing with the
dem ands o f a sm aller workforce. Very succinctly, Jack H anna, breeder of the hybrid
hard tom ato developed for mechanical harvesting, states the reasoning behind this
governm ent-funded research: "I’ve seen nationality after nationality out in the fields and
I felt that someday we might run out of nationalities to exploit" (Perelm an 1977, 73).
O ne U C Davis engineer, who had worked 13 years improving the lettuce harvester
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within the governm ent-funded agricultural extension service, described the chief
advantage of the machine, saying, it "won’t strike, it will work when they want it to work"
(Perelm an 1977, 75).
R esearchers emphasized the great "social benefits" of the new machinery such as
the new employment in processing and the money put into the m arket generated by
increased production. They did not look at the fact that farm ers were paid to produce
less, that the machinery was far too expensive for 80% of the farm ers to use, and that it
allowed a few large farmers to profit while smaller farm ers went bankrupt and migrants
jobless.
Though many have been encouraged to believe the course that agricultural
economy took, o f bankrupted small farms and the expansion of a few, was inevitable,
this is questionable. After looking at the direction the agricultural colleges and
extension services advised the government and farm ers to pursue, it becomes clear that
farm ers were influenced to take a particular, and in many aspects, destructive path.
Indeed, the research complex "played an ever m ore im portant role in the creation of
circumstance which caused farmers to change their strategies of agricultural resource
use" (Blok 1974, 1). Futherm ore,
The greatest failing of the land grant research is its total
abdication of leadership. At a time when rural America
desperately needjed] leadership, the land grant community
had ducked behind the corporate skirt, mumbling
apologetic words like "progress," "efficiency" and
"inevitability." Overall, it is a pedantic and cowardly
research system, and America is less for it (Hightower
1973, 85).
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Program s
P.L. 78, the bracero program, is the best example o f how the federal government
aided the farm ers in acquiring cheap labor, simultaneously preventing dom estic labor
from establishing government protection or improved conditions. Just as the
governm ent had forced 50,000 Mexicans across the border during the depression, during
the post-war period they contracted with the Mexican governm ent to hire braceros
(G alarza 1964, 47; Gam boa 1982,175).
Farm ers liked the braceros for its obvious advantages: C heap labor with few
obligations. During the bracero program, 1953 to 1963, m igrant wages rose from 83
cents to $1.03 while bracero wages remained at 80 cents. If transportation, loss o f money
to the U.S. economy because o f the contractual agreem ent to send 50% o f their wages
back to Mexico, meals, association dues for farmers to get them , contracting fees, and
camp supervision costs were all counted, the real expense would be known. But farmers
and the government supported this m ore expensive labor because they didn’t have to
concede to higher wages and other demands for improved work conditions. The use of
the braceros put pressure on the majority o f farmworkers, who were not braceros, to
work for a lower wage (Gam boa 1984, 22). These Mexican nationals were also effective
strikebreakers, used, for example, to end the 32 m onth old strike in California against
the DiGiorgio Fruit Company by the National Farm Labour U nion (R obertson 1969,
18). The bracero program ended only when Am erican unemployment rose again due to
mechanization, though activists had to fight against the farm lobby to the very end to
term inate this.
A fter the bracero program the government continued its services for Northwest
farm ers with the extension service paving the way for the use o f Mexican-Americans
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from the Southwest. The extension service planned conferences, contacted contractors,
designed advertisements, and set up centers as stopping places so M exican-Americans
wouldn’t stay in towns where they might disturb Oregonians (G am boa 1984, 294).
The government also encouraged the use of cheap labor from Mexico by
m aintaining a vague open door policy at the Mexican border from the end o f the bracero
program until the 1980s, pretending migrants weren’t coming across for jobs. Recently,
however, with American unemployment on the rise and many Am ericans accusing
Mexicans o f taking American jobs the border issue heated up. Senator A lan Simpson
went even further when he introduced his immigration reform bill (IR C A ) in 1982,
saying that the illegals from Mexico "threatens to harm American values, traditions,
institutions and . . . our way o f life" (Tom ar 1988, 197). Labor unions and liberal
democrats, who saw undocum ented workers destroying legal m igrants’ opportunities,
aligned themselves with the conservatives such as Simpson to support IR C A (Jack
Corbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990).
Farmers, however, did their part to prevent IRCA ’s im plem entation, insisting
that if it were passed legalized immigrants would be able to look for year round and
higher paying jobs. Even the state D epartm ent of Agriculture chim ed in, clarifying,
"We’ve got two choices, either have an adequate supply of labor . . . or allow growing
fruit (to be produced in) other countries" (Durbin 1981, C l). Though activists also
organized to defeat this bill because o f its discriminatory implications, it was to no avail.
In 1986 the Reagan administration pushed IRCA through. Once enacted, IRCA
lost its usefulness to all but a few undocum ented workers trying to become citizens.
IRCA both controlled the movement of the migrants and reduced their ability to acquire
anything but farm work. IRCA also took the strain off o f the governm ent to provide
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services for them. While the adm inistration implied that this law was m eant to provide a
better life for the illegals, this was so for only a very few. Instead, IR C A effectively
lim ited the num ber of illegals who could apply. Any migrants who had com m itted
felonies or m ore than two m isdemeanors, had received public assistance, o r had been
deported and returned illegally were disqualified. Those who were eligible for tem porary
residence status had to prove their past year’s stay within a very short and strict tim e
period. Extensive documentation, which was nearly impossible for migrants whose
survival depended on hiding any evidence of existence, was also required. Family
m em bers of a w orker who qualified had to wait up to ten years before they could
become citizens, and visa permits would remain hard to acquire. The costly application
procedure, which was extremely taxing on migrants, totalled $285 (Cowen 1987, A l).
W hile only a very few were allowed tem porary residency status, most of the rest lost
their invisibility by applying.
IRCA also affected the social services available to illegals. Now, workers had to
have docum entation before any state o r federal agencies were allowed to aid them.
U ndocum ented workers couldn’t even be told where jobs were available. M igrants who
could have previously been housed were sleeping under bridges in Portland, in cars and
in "worse-than-normal unsafe and unsanitary conditions." Families of newly docum ented
workers rem ained here illegally. But, they could not obtain help from governm ent
services. O f the 3,800 migrants who applied for legal status in 1988, 41% were m arried
(M cCarthy 1990, B l). M ultnomah County also experienced a rise of drug activity among
workers who could no longer get winter work perm its (Campillo 1990, B2; Jack Corbett,
personal interview, 8 August 1990). INS representative, David Beebe clarified his stance
on the predicam ent o f illegals:
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It’s a problem o f their own creation. They have to be
responsible for their own actions and obligations. We feel
no responsibility for taking care o f them. . . . There are
charitable organizations that may choose to help them , but
that is not done at taxpayer expense (McCarthy 1990, B l).
Many families of legal status workers who continued to live in the U nited States
rem ained hidden and without support.
In som e cases IR C A seem ed to actually have the opposite effect it was intended
to produce. Critics contended that it encouraged some employees to hire undocum ented
workers because they were cheap and, now with the threat o f deportation, couldn’t
complain.
Despite new "get tough" rhetoric, it became clear t h a t . . .
the law may have actually created incentives to hire them .
. . Many immigration attorneys claim IR C A has stripped
migrants o f their rights, in turn creating a new class o f
immigrants so desperate for work that they will accept
increasingly substandard wages and working conditions,
since employers used IRCA as a means o f withholding
paychecks, denying vacations and refusing to pay minimum
wages and overtime salaries (Tomar 1988, 196).
In Oregon m istreatm ent o f illegals by contractors was believed to have increased,
encouraging clergy, health workers and legislators to unite and pass several bills in 1989
to force contrac'.ois to provide for their workers (Campillo 1990, B2; McCarthy 1990a,
B l). Federal and State officials estim ated that 40% o f the migrants coming into Oregon
were still undocumented; many merely paid $500 to $800 for false docum entation
(McCarthy 1990a, B l).
While laws and aid reinforcing the power o f farm ers was provided regularly,
governm ent provisions for the migrant were, on the whole, ineffective. Program s, when
they were set in motion, lacked funding and therefore enforcement, and were so
tem poraiy and superficial that they accomplished far less than they could have (Oregon
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Migrant Health Project 1969). During times o f dire need such as a bad harvest, inclement
weather, o r early arrival o f far too many workers, a cry of panic would occasionally be
heard, but most often it fell on deaf ears, already comm itted to the large farm lobby.
Though there was concern at times, the issue o f who would pay for the m igrants’
improvements always plagued any progress.
Laws that applied to farm labor were passed in 1939 and 1959, then revised in
1969,1984 and 1989. Oregon statutes did cover sanitation, contractors, special school
provisions, transportation and field conditions, but the state laws were less stringent than
the federal ones and rarely enforced. The 1959 Farm Labor Codes "were at best, a poor
compromise between what constituted good camp housing and sanitation and what the
farmers and camp operators felt they could comply with at the time." The stronger
federal standards in existence were finally adopted in 1969 (Oregon Migrant Health
Project 1969, 24).
This lack of government protection left farmworkers excluded from the most
protective worker law in the U.S., the National Labor Relations Act. Farmworkers
rem ained without the right to bargain collectively, legally picket, gain the national
minimum wage, or have the right to apply for workmen’s compensation, unemployment
compensation, or public welfare. Nor were migrant workers protected by many child
labor restrictions that were granted to other workers. In its effort to protect the farm
owner the state government made sure farmworkers’ ability to strike was effectively
limited with the anti-picketing law enacted in 1962. Legislation to protect the right to
organize has yet to encompass the farmworker. Although som ething similiar to the
NLRA arbitration, which covers all other workers, could help to neutralize the dom inant
position o f the owner, the U.S. and Oregon government continued to deny these basic
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rights. The Oregon legislature tried to enact an arbitration board in 1971. Its
onesidedness caused Oregon AFL-CIO spokesman Ed W helan to proclaim that it would
have "stack[ed] all o f the cards against the agricultural worker" (Oregonian April 27,
1971, 2). Oregon politicians extended a farm picketing law in 1963 that restricted
workers. Previously, anyone who had worked three or m ore days could legally picket the
farm site. In 1963 they extended it to require protesters to have worked 15 days at the
same farm. This law was revoked by the state supreme court in 1990.
Until 1984 farmworkers were also the only occupational group not covered by
federal sanitation standards. And, as with most other standards imposed, it took
organized activists like the Migrant Legal Action Program to sue in 1987 for these
OSH A regulations to adequately cover farmworkers in the field (Frisvold 1988, 885).
W hat was regulated was often detrim ental to the migrant. Initially,
M exican-American migrants couldn’t get any aid under the 1939 Oregon Statute because
they had to live in the state from one to three years. M igrants were not given many
services allotted to other workers. Most were not covered by Social Security because
they were required to work with the same employer for at least 20 days during the year
and because their contractors didn’t file the paperwork. Employers who had a certain
payroll or over 500 man days in any quarter were required to pay the minimum wage,
but not overtime. Yet, migrants continued to pay taxes for services that they were
unable to receive. That included illegal aliens working in Oregon who often paid taxes
to avoid suspicion while still not receiving benefits (Cowen 1987b, D l).
Some restrictions prevented others from helping the migrants. Federal
regulations prohibited private agencies dedicated to servicing the migrants like the
Valley M igrant League from filing complaints about camps, allowing only those who had

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

71

an employer-employee relationship to complain, which basically im plied that the
employer m ust turn him o r herself in. In Oregon, even a contractor could not complain
since often there was no w ritten verification o f employment. The governm ent did not
prioritize the enforcem ent o f the few laws that did intend to protect the migrants. The
legal system did not punish those who broke the few laws th at were instituted to protect
the m igrant. W hen camp conditions w ere not m et, camps were often eith er allowed to
stay open o r charged a nom inal fee. W hen contractors were corrupt they were rarely
prosecuted and when they were the punishm ent was unfairly lenient. In 1962 two
contractors found guilty o f m istreatm ent were given the option to spend 60 days in jail
o r leave the state immediately (Bianco 1962b, 27). This is in contrast to the time and
money the governm ent spent to deport illegals after the season had ended (Gam boa
1984, 150).
M igrants were occasionally helped when the government thought it would be
m ore damaging for the sta te ’s economy not to give help, o r if the conditions looked as
though they would either cause a national emergency for the farmers o r create a food
shortage. For instance, in the 1969 G overnor’s R eport, the governm ent stressed the
need for retraining o f the m igrants as mechanization caused unem ploym ent because
otherwise the "welfare system will be burdened" (K adera 1969, 6).
Although the governm ent often did little for the migrants, it was capable of
acting with speed. The governm ent’s ability to respond quickly was seen during
"Operation Harvest 1974," when a gas shortage threatened to reduce the labor force
because o f long gas lines and high prices. The farmers, fearing a reduction o f workers
from the Southwest willing or able to make the long trip, dem anded im m ediate action
from the governm ent. Many agencies united, setting up 24 hour gas stations, maps in
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Spanish and English and providing recruitm ent services. Agencies involved included the
Office o f Economic Opportunity, the D epartm ent of Agriculture, the D epartm ent of
Labor, the Federal Energy Office and the D epartm ent o f H ealth, Education and W elfare
(Oregonian 9 April 1974, 2).
Although the government could move quickly when it felt it to be necessary,
much o f the tim e the governm ent dragged its feet in aiding the migrants. Ex-migrant
and activist, David Aguilar o f Chicano Cultural Centro expressed his frustration with this
when he declared, "people in the state government are just trying to stall, hoping
machines will replace the migrant before the state has to do something" (Oregonian, July
7,1972, 24). Although it was certainly m ore complicated than this, action was slow when
it occurred at all.
The response o f the government was instead limited to conducting studies.
Rarely were the recommendations followed. Several major studies of labor camps and
housing were done: the 1958 Bureau o f Labor study, and the 1962, 1966 and 1969
governor’s reports, conducted by the OSU extension service. W hat the earlier housing
studies found were atrocious conditions for expensive rates estim ated at up to 50% of
the m igrants’ wages (Infante and C urrent 1958, 20). G overnor McCall’s study called for
"immediate improvement o f migrant education, housing, health services, nutrition,
working conditions and contractual arrangements" (Kadera 1969, 6). But, again, no
further action was taken. Bills might be proposed to study the situation further or even
change the laws but they rarely survived. For example, a Senate Joint Resolution in
1957 was passed to study the corruption among contractors and H ouse Bill 435 was
proposed the same year to strengthen the law "so that they cannot dump workers after
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promising them certain periods o f work at an agreed rate of pay," but nothing ever cam e
o f it (Oregonian, 14 May 1957, CI12).
While politicians often gave lip service to seeking improvements for the migrant,
their voting record instead outlined support for the farmers and for their ability to
acquire a cheap and steady supply of labor. For instance, when the Javits Bill,
attem pting to prevent youth under age 12 from working farms other than neighbor farms
up to 25 miles from home came up in 1966, Oregon Senator Wayne M orse helped defeat
it, claiming that it was "nonsense to suggest that Oregon children are being exploited"
Instead, he claimed, farmwork was productive for children, saying, "it taught them m ore
than their parents could teach them about the value and importance o f work"
(Oregonian, 27 August 1966, 8). Senators Wayne M orse and M ark H atfield steadily
supported the bracero program throughout its existence. Senator M orse declared his
support stating, "American labor is not hurt one iota. The reason for this is that there
isn’t an American worker who would do this type of stoop labor" (Oregonian, 3
Septem ber 1963, 19). Hatfield said that the program helped Mexicans, U.S.-Mexican
relations and was a deterrent to communism (Bianco 1964a, S13).
W hen funds were destined for aid to farmworkers, decisions as to how they
would be spent were made at the top by people who were not fam iliar with the daily
needs of the migrant. Because of this agencies’ programs were funded or cancelled
regardless of progress made (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1971, 5).
New plans and progressive insights were created to solve the problem and then
cancelled because of lack of funding. The new plan was im plem ented, and yet
something else had to be cut, even if it was successful. Regardless o f the results o f a
program, it could never be an ultimate success because it always lacked enough funding
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to fulfill the need. Though during the bracero program the governm ent agreed with the
Mexican government to a set wage and promised to prevent any discrim ination against
the braceros the governm ent did not fund the enforcem ent o f these rules and so they
were not followed. There were only two inexperienced Mexican inspectors for the whole
Northwest, including Utah, Idaho and M ontana, who were given their jobs because they
were friends o f the M inister o f Labor (Gamboa 1984, 203). In 1970 the M igrant Health
Project, the best program that had thus far existed for the migrants, was cancelled to
make way for programs with that would follow a newly proposed idea "so that migrants
could have the opportunity to make their own decisions regarding their own health
problems." It was unclear how the Project had failed to do that except that it had not
been created under this new banner (Migrant Health Project 1971, 5). A nother example
of the lack of funding affecting the implementation o f a program occurred under IRCA.
While IRCA ordered that employers were to be fined or im prisoned on their second
violation if they were caught knowingly hiring illegals, farm ers had little to worry about
since the INS’ budget was simultaneously cut in half that same year.
In 1987 an injury-from-pesticides system was instituted under the H ealth Division
Office, ordered by the new federal standards. The system required employers to provide
information and training on hazardous chemicals used in the workplace. But again, no
effective means of enforcing it was used because of lack o f funds (Rosem ary 1989, G2).
The funding war left local governments on the frontlines without state funds to
provide for local health care or other services, leaving those most capable empty-handed,
unable to handle the migrants’ most desperate needs. T he 1971 O regon M igrant Health
Project stressed that since there were few funds set aside
the small communities or counties will bear the financial
loss. Local governments do not receive state funds to
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provide local health care services and their local ability to.
finance such services does not m eet even the need o f the
residents, let alone the migrants (Oregon Migrant Health
Project 1971, 5).
Funding was not the only problem. Most o f the actions o f th e governm ent were
perform ed by separate agencies, uncoordinated and unorganized as a whole, leaving
duplications o r huge holes in service. This lack of cohesiveness v 'aS seen early on.
Because o f the decentralization o f the Office o f Labor and the autonom y given to the
state extension service during the im portation of Mexican nationals, bracero contracts
could easily be circumvented or ignored, with the distance between the braceros and the
Mexican consulate making it nearly impossible for the Mexicans to even lodge a
complaint (G am boa 1984, 204).
In later years the same problem persisted. For example, although four state
agencies inspected m igrant housing, not one oversaw the efforts. In the case of
overseeing the camps, the State Board of Health wrote the guidelines, the County
H ealth departm ents notified camps of their lack of compliance, but the Bureau o f Labor
had to be the one to close a cam p down (Oregon G overnor’s Task Force 1969, 7). To
organize the M igrant H ealth Project seven federal and state agencies and 14 local service
organizations had to be unified {Migrant Health Project 1970-71). Funding for adult
migrant education program s also functioned in this fashion, with the 1976 progarm
requiring support from the State W elfare and Education departm ents, three school
districts and three county welfare agencies (Lopez 1976, 29). A nother fine example of
this division o f responsibilities, was the Bureau of Labor, which could regulate camp
facilities for women and minor children but could not involve itself in m atters relating to
other workers {Oregonian, 14 May 1957, CI12). Though many times it was
recom m ended that these separations should be mended, "no state agency has [gained]
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the responsibility of viewing the problem s of seasonal agricultural workers in a general
integrated basis" (O regon G overnor’s Task Force 1969, 7).
This separation o f responsibilities had two consequences. First, agencies’ hands
were tied, because they each had the ability to perform only one o f the many steps
necessary to com plete an action. If these two agencies were not working together
neither could com plete the process. For instance, the Oregon Bureau o f Labor had the
jurisdiction to put closure notices on farms, but the county sanitarians had to close them
within 24 hours (Olmos 1964b, 24). This stopped even the most com m itted workers.
Ismael B arrera, a Bureau o f Labor inspector voiced his

frustration about this lack of

cohesiveness in 1960: "When I see things like this I get angry. I get even angrier when I
think that I’ve already told the county sanitarian about this and nothing has been done
to correct it" (Olmos 1968a, 17).
The second consequence was that it encouraged departm ents to lobby and battle
one another for the same money. O ut o f desperation duplicate regulations drawn from
different departm ents developed. These policies often conflicted, further confusing
farm ers as well as state agencies who, in turn, declared that they couldn’t follow
government regulations because they didn’t know to which departm ent’s to adhere. One
reporter wrote: "Growers contend they can’t upgrade their camps until the problem is
resolved" (Oregonian, 7 July 1972, 24). A nother farm er stated that "there are so many
people involved in checking camps -- three or four agencies -- it’s become a m atter of
politics" (Oregonian, 5 July 1970,14).
W hen concerned individuals working for a specific agency did decide to set forth
programs to help in ways for which they saw a direct need, they were told they were out
of the agency’s legal jurisdiction (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1970, 4). This
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immobilized government workers since many agencies would stop themselves from
acting, fearing that they would be reprimanded for acting inappropiately. An example of
this was the State Board o f H ealth, which in 1970 was attem pting to revise some o f the
health standards for camps. They wanted to change the requirem ent for the num ber of
toilets to include the children the migrants inevitably brought with them . But they didn’t
"because the board decided it did not have the power to change the law on this point"
(Floyd 1970, C3).
W hen departm ents and agencies weren’t battling each other they could plan on a
battle with the very uncooperative farm bureaus. One account of this was in M arion
county in 1970 when the local farm bureau wanted to be lax on the camp health
regulations. It took the local health departm ent, the Board o f H ealth and the B ureau of
Labor, nudged by the Migrant Health Project, to finally assign a lawyer to notify them to
get in compliance or have the camps they ran be closed down (Oregon Migrant Health
Project 1970).
A nother aspect of the programs kept them from improving the conditions for the
migrants. Government programs and workers by and large failed to recognize cultural
and community pressures which discouraged the migrants from using their services
(Fitzgibbon 1990; Oregonian 23 May 1969; Swan 1990; W entworth 1960). Mexicans, for
instance, have a tradition called guela gueltza which prom otes reciprocity and exchange of
goods and assistance. Thus, they rely on each other for help and do not com prehend the
governm ent’s services because they feel they will ultimately owe back (Jack Corbett,
personal interview, 8 August 1990).
G overnm ent officials and health and social service agents finally began to
com prehend the cultural barriers that limited them. Police in W oodburn, Hillsboro and
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Portland as well as elsewhere only began in the late eighties to understand the
im portance of training their forces in Spanish and in cultural body language in o rder to
reduce tensions between themselves and the Hispanic community (Coonrod 1985, B2;
Ulrich 1984, C2). In 1990, M ultnomah County employees urged the county to hire m ore
Spanish-speaking and culturally sensitive personnel to work with the H ispanic inm ates,
who by 1990 occupied 20% of the jail beds in the spring months (M oore 1990b, E l). In
1990 Portland, at the request o f policeman Sheridan Grippen, also sponsored a class for
government workers and police on the Spanish language and cultural awareness
(Campillo 1990, B2). And in Washington County in 1990 approximately 80 personnel
were trained in Spanish (Jack Corbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990).
The lack o f trust or comprehension the migrants had for the governm ent workers
who tried to make contact with them seem ed insurmountable. Migrants, at best, felt
they could take care of themselves. At worst, they often feared that referrals for medical
care were just ploys for m ore business for the physicians (Oregon Migrant Health Project
1964-65, 8).
The government functioned on the assumption that if they provided a health
service, announcing it in written form, then it was up to the individual to come and use
it. Professor Joseph Gallegos, a researcher at the University o f Portland, expressed this
assumption:
Historically, there has been an institutional lack of
sensitivity to the needs o f minorities in the state. It was as
though institutions said, ‘Our services are out there but it’s
up to you to come to us’" (Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1).
The effort to cross this barrier required trem endous spirit, initiative and careful
thinking. This was accomplished by private, non-profit organizations. H ealth workers at
El Nino Sano Health Clinic in Hood River, a nonprofit private agency functioning on a
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federal grant from the U.S. Bureau o f M aternal and Child Care, found that a two
contact system was required to develop trust. T he workers showed that trust could, with
persistence, be established. They found that waiting for the migrants to come to them
was a mistake. First, a Hispanic lay health w orker would go out to visit and then the
doctor would come. They also effectively connected with the migrant community by
taking seven o f the m igrant women and training them as the contact health persons.
The doctor, Tina Castanares, who founded the project, was trained under the H ealth
Facilitators, a national organization designed to train lay health workers to work in low
income, rural areas. She in turn proceeded to instruct the seven o th er women, all o f
whom speak Spanish, with four speaking only that language (Stein 1990, L I).
Throughout this general state o f inaction some governm ent workers and
politicians repeatedly made concerted efforts. Those who stood out included Senator
D on W illner, Representative Edith G reen, State Senator M aurine N euberger, State
R epresentative and Chairm an of the Kennedy Action Com m ittee V era Katz, and m ore
recently State R epresentative Les Aucoin. They spoke out against the farm lobby and
laws that were unfair, and on behalf of the migrants, recom mending and proposing the
im plem entation o f funding for various services that would aid the migrants.
R epresentative Edith G reen was the only Oregon delgate in 1963 to vote against the
extension of the bracero program , claiming that while it hurt the family farm it
disproportionately helped corporate farms (Franklin 1963, 22). W hen SB 406, the
anti-picketing law, was on the floor to be extended in 1963 W illner opposed it, stating:
"It discriminates against the group in our society least able to protect themselves"
(Hughes 1963, 9).
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W illner, Katz, Aucoin and others joined marches and spoke at meetings. Some
offered their expertise, such as W illner who provided legal counsel as a lawyer for the
U FW in 1967 ( H earing Schedule, Commission on Agricultural W orkers 1 June 1990,1;
Olmos 1967, C2). Government workers joined together in committees, pushing for
stricter enforcem ent of farm and field codes, speaking on panels, or testifying about
discrim ination and tense community relations between police and Hispanics. These
government representatives also prom oted the development o f culturally sensitive and
bilingual program s (M oore 1990a, C2; Pederm an 1982, C2) They supported surveys and
studies which allowed policies to be m ade (Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1; M oore 1990a, C2).
The politicians spoke to the press to give support and inform ation about the
conditions o f the migrants and the lack of protection the government provided. Willner,
in his concerted effort to push for minimum wages, unemployment insurance and
collective bargaining for the migrants, put it succinctly:
We are not really being fair so long as migrants are
excluded from workm en’s compensation, unemployment
conpensation, most o f public welfare, the state
labor-managem ent law and much o f the minimum wage
legislation (Oregonian, 29 January 1967, 24; Oregonian, 18
M arch 1967, 21).
T here is no doubt that the programs that were implemented, however tem porary,
sporadic or ineffective, can be credited to the sincere effort and dedicated work o f those
few legislators who concerned themselves with the farmworkers.
The state and federal agencies most commonly involved in programs for the
migrants included the State D epartm ents of Agriculture, Education, Employment, Health,
Labor, W elfare as well as the federal W orkm en’s Com pensation Board, the Office of
Equal Opportunity, and the Farm ers’ Hom e Administration (Kirchm eier 1980, B3;
Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969, 10).
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A few special education programs and acts were developed by the government.
Pilot summer school projects occurred sporadically in various locations, depending on the
year. Vocational training and adult education were occasionally funded by the O E O and
carried out by the Valley M igrant League (VML), a quasi-government agency (Guernsey
1967; Olmos 1976; Sansregret 1983; Wentworth 1962). In 1966 California, O regon and
Washington united with the intention o f maintaining pocket-sized student records,
containing grades, special needs, and ability levels.
Health and housing programs were sporadic at best. An average of 700 camps
filed notices o f usage each year, but until the 1960s only a self-inspection system was used
(iOregon Migrant Health Project 1969, 6). Even after an inspection system was in place the
same relaxed attitude persisted, with a State Sanitation Division representative in 1984
being quoted as saying: "The farmers know what the rules are and I think they comply
with them" (Hogan 1984, B l). Later when there were inspections, power was so scattered
among the agencies and so little funding was provided that ineffectiveness persisted.
Only five percent of government inspectors’ tim e was spent the farm labor camps
(Rural Tribune May 1978, 1). On the average only 25% o f the farms were inspected each
year. Statistics in 1970 bear witness to the lack of enforcement that occurred even when
camps were inspected. Although 506 camps met the lenient standards when inspected
315 did not. O f those 315,165 were still allowed to open (Oregon Migrant Health Project
1971, 29). Between 1979 and 1984 no camps were inspected (Hogan 1984, B l).
Even when inspections were made, many farms with defects were allowed to stay
open without fines or corrections made. The limited num ber of inspectors forced the
government workers to be very superficial, as one set o f inspections in 1978 by O SPIRG
showed, finding 66 violations com pared to the 23 violations found by the state inspector
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(Lopez 1978, 25). Only a $100 fine and possible closure were the penalties for not
complying with state regulations on housing. And, as O SPIR G stated, if the fines were
not m ore than it costs to correct the problem, then the fines were not going to be the
incentive (Lopez 1978, 25).
The standards by which inspections were rated were very low. Farm w orkers were
the only occupational group that was not covered by the federal sanitation standards.
A fter being challenged with lawsuits since 1972 by the national M igrant legal Action
Program , twelve years later in 1984 the State W orkers’ Com pensation D epartm ent’s
Accident Prevention Division reported that it would begin a m andatory, scheduled
inspection policy that would hit every camp in Oregon over a 3 year cycle (Frisvold 1988,
885; H ogan 1984, B l).
T he O EO M igrant Health Project provided the best governm ent funded health
care the migrants would receive in Oregon. This project displays an overall view of the
functionings of the government when it provided aid to the migrants. The M H P was an
excellent example of the potential the government had to better the conditions of the
migrants. A t the same time this project showed the inadequacies caused by the
requirem ent for annual renewal of funding, the top-heavy decision-making and the lack of
long-term planning ultimately caused by the lack o f funding (Oregon Migrant Health
Project 1964-71).
As was the case here, aid was most often offered only through special programs.
Projects were understaffed and temporary, creating immense inefficiency. Program s were
given minimal power to make changes and cancelled if they tried to use regulations that
were not being enforced. Resistence was met at every corner, and program s were
cancelled just as they became effective. And, even with the com m itted staff that was
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acquired, ineffectiveness persisted because o f the lack o f cultural training provided to
them {Oregon Migrant Health Project 1964-71).
The M H P lasted from 1963-1971. By 1970 the M H P serviced migrants in up to
13 counties, where 90% of the migrants resided. It averaged about 18,000 patients a
sum m er, equalling approximately 20-30% of the migrants, and provided hom e visits,
physicals, m inor medicinal aid, referrals to partially funded doctors and pocket-sized
health histories {Oregon Migrant Health Project 1970, 10). C am p conditions, which the
project at first did nothing bout, gave rise to the spreading o f disease and long recoveries.
Lack o f heat, clean or hot water, m odern toilet o r cooking facilities, combined with
overcrowding and rodents, m ade it hard to keep things under control. Soon the M H P
added sanitation checks to clean up the migrants’ environment.
The M H P was troubled with hiring and rehiring each spring, forced to begin anew
each season as it regained its annual funding. As soon as the staff had gained the trust of
the m igrants, the season would be near its end, and, because o f the workload and low
pay, m ost would not return the following season. The problem o f gaining the trust o f the
m igrants proved enorm ous, especially since few o f the workers spoke Spanish or
understood the culture of the migrants.
Lack o f coordination among agencies also hurt the effort. Transportation costs,
use o f local clinics and extended services all had to be funded from different departm ents,
and the tim e required to apply and receive the funds could be years later. The health
workers, who becam e most familiar with the camp conditions, were repeatedly told that
their concern for the effect the camps had on the health of the migrants was beyond their
jurisdiction. W hen they insisted on m ore power and pushed through the inspections o f
camps the whole project lost its funding. The governm ent employees were told that they
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were performing functions out o f their jurisdiction. In effect, the most successful
governm ent program that provided services to the m igrants was cancelled for essentially
becoming m ore effective (Oregon Migrant Health Project 1971, 5).
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CHAPTER IV

RESISTANCE

COM MUNITY

Against the many odds, migrants and ex-migrants m aintained and developed
support systems that allowed them to care for each other, retain their culture, and fight
against the oppressive forces they encountered. Most importantly, Hispanic m igrants’
familial, religious and cultural strength provided refuge. Over time this support has
expanded in Oregon, centered in the small rural communities where many Chicanos have
settled. Union activism also flowed out of this cultural and familial affiliation. This
community spirit also produced activists among the ex-migrants com m itted to improving
migrant conditions. As time progressed these Chicano activists directed Anglo activists,
moving from purely religious guidance and charity to legal and legislative resistance and
the creation o f self-help organizations.
Forced to respond to oppression by farmers, contractors, and local communities,
migrants in Oregon banded together to protect each other. The continual changes of
the seasons, its effect on crops and thus the amount o f labor needed, added to their
distress and helped the migrants maintain a strong community and support system based
primarily on the extended family to help them during hard times. This unification
consistently rem ained the strongest form of resistance to outside forces the migrants had.
Though the conditions o f their living remained difficult, the migrants as a whole
were able to sustain a higher level o f pride and independence than would be expected.
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They retained a strong sense of family, which included extended members, villagers, and
long-time acquaintances. With the little money they m ade, many supported their
families and friends, especially through hard times when work was scarce. Many
regularly rem itted money to those family members left in Mexico o r other Latin
Am erican countries (Jack Corbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990). W hen lack of
housing existed m igrants were often taken in by others in an already overcrowded house,
tent, trailer o r car (Lagra 1969, 40).
This strength o f community spirit and willingness to help each other kept them
surviving under horrid conditions. A fine example comes from a study o f m igrants in
nearby Washington state. One migrant, Jorge M ena, gave a good steady job which he
had held for four m onths to a friend who arrived from the Southwest because, "I did not
have a alternative, I give to my friend my job because I can find me other job much
faster than he" (Lagra 1969, 93).
The trem endous pride and desire for independence these migrants held led to a
general distrust o f others outside o f their community. A nurse from Portland’s Nurse
Practioners’ Community H ealth Clinic described this in one migrant family:
The Gomezes are independent. They don’t ask for help.
They want to do for themselves. They didn’t come right
out and say they had these [health] needs, but they kept
coming back with the same kinds o f illnesses" (M cD erm ott
1990, K l).
A nother volunteer who interviewed elderly Hispanics in Portland told of one woman
living on $99 a month,
She was distressed but very proud. . . . There is a sense of
suffering with dignity among many o f those I interviewed.
A sense that "We are poor but we can take care o f
ourselves" (Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1).
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Hispanics were successful in m aintaining their religious and cultural traditions with this
familial closeness, reinforced by constant movement and a rural environm ent. Studies
have shown that they had a stronger sense o f culture and self-esteem than those who had
settled out (Gecas 1973; Wells 1976).

C U LTU RE

The strength the Hispanic migrant families held lay in their deep cultural and
religious roots. Each o f the twenty-three different Hispanic cultures found in Oregon
has m aintained its identity (Perschiera 1990, 4M EP1). Men gathered in associations
according to the area or particular culture from which they come. This is especially true
o f the Mexteca Indians who felt an affinity with each other. T heir Benito Juarez
Association is centered in Salem (Jack Corbett, personal interview, 8 August 1990).
The m igrants’ expression of these cultures was reflected everywhere in their
communities. M igrants regularly celebrated holidays such as el dia de las madres, made
ethnic food, and, when possible, grew gardens full o f jalapenos, cilantro, and tomatillos.
Chickens, pigs, and other farm animals were kept when they were able to stay year
round or winter in one location (Gamboa 1984,158).
Music and dance clubs were opened in many towns. D uring the bracero program
m en pooled the little money they could spare and bought jukeboxes, purchased or
brought up Mexican records, gathered for dances and music, and rented nationalistic,
pre-revolutionary films about rural heros which they showed in large tents on county
fairgrounds (Gam boa 1973, 60). Tejano o r musica nortena, a combination o f south
Texas, Mexican, and G erm an bohemian could be heard (Gam boa 1973, 60). Many local
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bands played weekly throughout the state. Radio stations broadcast weekly and daily
Hispanic music and news shows in Portland, W oodburn, Salem and Hillsboro.
Ex-migrants attem pting to settle out congregated in small towns such as Nyssa,
Cornelius, W oodburn and Gervais. Migrants, too, who w orked in the outlying areas,
gathered there in the summers. In these smaller towns Hispanics did not lose their
community or culture as they would have in Portland (Gecas 1973; G utierrez 1983;
Slatta 1975). In these towns with large Hispanic populations Chicanos have attem pted
to keep alive many traditional ways. Spanish signs and posters line the streets and
businesses, and bakeries and restaurants serve Mexican and other Latino foods. In
W oodburn the dance club posted its signs first in Spanish and then in English. Parking
lots took the place o f the traditional Mexican plaza, with m en gathering to socialize
there (M artinis 1987, B2; Slatta 1979, 160).
In W oodburn, Nyssa, Cornelius and Gervais where, Hispanic culture was strong,
the Chicano community struggled for power in city councils, pushing for m ore culturally
sensitive school and policing policies. Though Chicanos rem ained under-represented in
most political positions, even where a large percentage of the community is Hispanic,
they did m ake progress (Hinkley and Olmos 1984, B7).
D espite the sustenance migrants gained from their culture, as this settled
minority grew in population many rem ained voiceless and invisible. In 1964 the Oregon
M igrant H ealth Project, a government agency working directly with migrants, noted 330
Spanish-speaking farm labor families in M alheur County who had perm anently settled,
still working the fields and still quite poor. It stated, "some of these people have been in
the area for 20 years and do not feel a part of the community" (Oregon Migrant Health
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Project 1964, 9). And in 1990, a health worker said: "They’re isolated and they’re lonely.
. . . They want to talk to someone" (Stein 1990, LI).
Religious faith helped the migrants survive their conditions. O f the 100,000
Hispanics now residing in Oregon 71% were Catholic (Butterworth 1991, C l). Many
were devout. Some recruited Catholic priests to say mass at 5:30 a.m. before they
worked the fields or to perform such religious ceremonies as blessing a truck before they
ventured the long journey to and from home (Gamboa 1973, 58; K adera 1969, 6;
M artinis 1987, B2). Oregon Catholic dioceses with large Hispanic congregations have
incorporated Hispanic religious ceremonies and began to say Masses in Spanish.
Hispanic migrants responded by attending Mass in great numbers. W hen migrants
arrived in the spring, Catholic communities bulged. Ceremonies such as Mananitas, a
traditional Christmas pageant, Los Posada a recreation o f Joseph and M ary’s search for
lodging, as well as celebrations on Ash Wednesday, Good Friday and All Souls Day were
included in the churches’ traditions (Blackmun 1990, 4M E P 8).

UN IO N ACTIVITY AND LABOR RESISTANCE

Labor unrest in Oregon among Hispanic migrant farmworkers expressed itself in
the forms of camp vandalism, the refusal to work at particular locations, lack of
cooperation with local police, violence and small strikes (Gam bao 1984; M azano 1987;
Robertson 1969). As one migrant said, vandalism was "the m igrant’s only way to leave a
message, to ask for better housing" (Floyd 1968, 29).
Migrants also avoided areas where they had been previously m istreated for as
long as they could afford. It was not uncommon to have a loss of labor for the next two
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seasons in an area due to low wages or bad conditions (Bianco 1958; Guernsey 1971;
Infante and C urrent 1958; Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969).
The attem pt to unionize was dangerous and therefore naturally sporadic. After
the union activity o f the 1930s and 1940s the Northwest farm ers stepped up their efforts
through alliances to control labor unrest (Newbill 1977, 83).
Failure o f the International W orkers o f the W orld in
Yakima is easy to explain . . . the wobblies could not hope
to match strength with the farm ers whose allies were many.
In addition to the chamber of commerce and local
newspapers, farmers enjoyed the support o f city police,
county sheriffs, state patrol and National G uard. These
law-enforcement groups went well beyond what was
necessary to m aintain law and order (Newbill 1977, 83).
During the post-war period farmers had beaten unionism, and they were intent
on net suffering through another bout of it. Even though they had the police force and
political m achine behind them , they knew the power and the trouble union activism
could create (Austerm ann 1970; Guernsey 1971; Newbill 1977). Farm ers turned to
foreign labor, such as the Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, and Mexicans. This had proven
useful before because foreign labor was isolated, desperate for jobs, and could be
shipped out when the job was done. The use of braceros, and later illegal Mexicans,
seem ed to the farmers to make good sense (McWilliams 1939; R obertson 1969).
Even though the farm ers used foreign labor in Oregon to quell the possibility of
labor unrest, outbreaks o f dissent still occurred among the braceros. G am boa found that
during the bracero program the Northwest was a "hotbed o f labor unrest for over four
years." The braceros struck because o f discrimination and the uncompromising attitude
o f the farm ers over conditions such as wages, food, or camps. The im provem ents that
the farm ers had to make to stop the rebellions were still far less than what was
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dem anded by domestics during the thirties. And the braceros could be sent hom e at the
end o f the season (Gam boa 1984, 345).
Many other factors further reduced the chance for unionism. W orkers were
constantly on the move and had very little money, and thus it was hard for organizers to
be financially supported or to get to the workers, who lived on private farm s where
farm ers restricted their entrance (Lopez 1976; Olmos 1965; Penny 1957). In 1969 alone
60 affidavits were filed in 20 weeks in an effort to force farm ers to allow governm ent
workers onto the camps (Oregonian, 12 August 1969, 11).
The unions, unaided by m em bership dues, had financial troubles. They were
forced to rely on donations from industrial unions, which, by and large, were either
unreceptive to the conditions o f migrants o r unable to fund them when they were
sympathetic because o f their own financial woes (Robertson 1969, 18). Although the
industrial unions provided advice and support at times, essential financial support was
not forthcoming.
M igrants usually distrusted anyone but their contractor and family, which added
to the woes o f the already overburdened organizer (Robertson 1969, 5). Unfortunately
these contractors did the work unions would have done, except that the benefits didn’t
go to the workers. Divisions between full-time migrants and part-tim e farm workers as
well as racial or ethnic conflicts existed.
Those who saw farm labor as only part-tim e supplem ental work, perceiving their
stay in this kind o f labor as only tem porary, could not afford to commit to sacrificing
their daily wage for long term improvements. Furtherm ore, som e farmers paid the
migrants with a bonus for staying the whole time, in effect lowering the wage and then
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making it up with a bonus, which m eant that if workers struck they lost even m ore o f
their income.
The sacrifices needed to battle the farm ers proved too m uch for m ost.
Conditions rem ained so bad that despair often set in, with many holding the belief that
change could not take root. Their poverty level also reduced their willingness to strike.
As had been seen in California, unionization was most feasible when there was a
sense o f oneness, o f commonality, and that seem ed to be most likely in areas where one
crop was grown and where skills involved in farming were common am ong a large
segment o f the labor force. Corporate farms in California had been easier to bargain
with because they had a greater profit margin. N either o f these conditions have been
prom inent in Oregon, where crops varied greatly and farms were relatively smaller
(Robertson 1969, 20).
Strikes, the strongest tool for industrial unions, were largely ineffective in the
struggle to organize farmworkers. During the 1960s and afterwards farm workers found
that when they struck they couldn’t control the entry o f large acreage farms and that
consumers were often unwilling to boycott basic foods. Oregon laws left them
unprotected since the NLRA did not cover them as it did other workers. Thus farmers
were not legally required to allow or bargain with unions. Farmworkers were also not
legally protected when they struck. Furtherm ore, the potential o f a food shortage
allowed farmers to contend that striking was a national security issue, justifying the
creation and implem entation of an Oregon law which prevented picketing near farms.
This law rem ained until 1990 (Oregonian 27 April 1971, 2; Oregonian 5 M arch 1990, C5).
Strikes occurred regularly throughout the bracero program when they had a
contract. Later migrants did not have a contract and were unable to rebel without grave
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repercussions. Although many migrants worked through a contractor the agreem ent was
purely oral and usually covered only a place to work and live. These migrants of the
1970s and 1980s merely had a chance for work under a contractor. W hile the braceros
had guaranteed work, other migrants com peted for their jobs. M echanization increased
the scarcity of jobs even more.
Regardless of the great odds, activists in the late 1960s continued to try to
organize the farmworkers, with the UFW leading the effort. They were encouraged by
events in California. In 1959 the AFL-CIO Organizing Campaign of Agricultural
W orkers in California (AWOC) attem pted to gather momentum, striking in 1965 in the
grape fields of Delano, only to find that the farmers replaced them with braceros. Soon
after, AW O C merged with the National Farm W orker Association to create the U nited
Farm W orkers. They then began a series of very successful consum er boycotts. The
union was finally recognized by the farmers. Wages increased by 25% and some fringe
benefits were included in a contract (Robertson 1969, 18).
Apparently, inspiration was gained from the California movem ent because during
this same time resistance heightened in parts of Oregon. As early as 1961 discussions
about joining up with the UFW occurred among the migrants. Different from the past,
this new activism was led by migrants and ex-migrants rather than by activists outside of
the field (Robertson 1969, 8).
In the late sixties, migrants and ex-migrants joined the UFW , no longer wanting
the old, conservative charity organizations to continue the same way. They dem anded
that the Valley Migrant League, the largest non-profit agency acquiring funds from the
governm ent to aid the migrants, improve wages and perm anent conditions instead of
funding day care centers. The UFW and the local union VIVA tried to provide

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without p erm ission.

94
settlem ent aid, legal counseling, health care and career advancement. They understood
that their effort must be to create a sense o f community to prepare O regon for
unionization (Olmos 1967; McNulty 1968; Robertson 1969). A t this tim e they began the
plan to set up cases which would allow them to fight the anti-picket law enacted in 1969.
Their victory would be finalized 21 years later in 1990 when this law was declared
unconstitutional (Oregonian 5 M arch 1990, C5).
Farm ers feared what they saw as Chavez-inspired infiltrators and united against
this activism (Austermann 1970; Guernsey 1971; Kadera 1970; Olm os 1969; Robertson
1969). In 1971, farm ers nearly succeeding in enacting Senate Bill 67, which would have
forced one-way binding arbitration. Although this law was never enacted, it is valuable
to observe to show the anti-union attitudes of farmers and politicians. The proposal was
to hold elections early enough so that migrants couldn’t participate, allowing only
perm anent employees to vote each year. It would have established wages and
conditions, with a three m em ber labor relations board appointed by the governor, who
usually stood firmly on the farm ers’ side. A t least one represenative from the state
Board o f Agriculture, another conservative force would be reserved a spot on this
arbitration board.
S.B. 67 would have authorized farmers threatened by a strike or lockout to
invoke fact finding procedures binding upon both parties if accepted by the farm er. The
farm er would have had the sole right to reject the facts or call for as many new fact
findings until the farm er was satisfied with one. U nder this law workers would not have
been able to strike until the facts had been accepted by the farmer, allowing the farm er
to stall until the crop had been picked. This passed the senate. Finally, it was defeated
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after a rallying cry from industrial and farm worker unions, church groups and political
activists put pressure on legislators (Oregonian 27 April 1971, C5).
In the late eighties one union was able to develop strength. T he Pineros Y
Campesinos Unidos Del Noroeste, the Northwest Tree Planters and Farm w orkers U nited
(PCU N ), had the advantage of having m em bers who were covered by federal
reforestation laws that allowed them som e security in minimum wages and conditions.
PC U N originally grew out o f community service dealing with raids and deportations in
the early eighties. They continued to expand their efforts to all farm workers and also
becam e active on the political and legislative scene. Presently, 65% o f the union
m em bers are settled Oregonians in the W illamette Valley.
PC U N ’s successes offered encouragem ent. This union united the workers against
IRCA , helping to reduce its destructive nature before it was enacted. In 1990 they won
a suit against G overnor Goldschmidt and the state of O regon striking down the 1962
O regon statute that prohibited picketing at Oregon farm lands (Oregonian 5 M arch 1990,
C5). In 1990 they also won a case against radio station KBEY located in W oodburn
when a Spanish music and news program funded by the union was cancelled for
describing a conflict with growers. Although the owner o f the station claim ed it was
anti-grower in nature the courts found this to be illegal. The court decision declared
that the owner must allow the show back on his station (Oregonian 27 July 1990, A23).
Union members gained the support o f the UFW and Cesar Chavez, who toured
through Oregon with them . They also have been aided by the AFL-CIO in their battle
against the anti-picketing law. Its m em bership has risen from 400 in 1986 to over 2,700
in 1990 (McCarthy 1990a, B l; Oregonian 5 March 1990, C5).
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O ne reason PCUN was initially able to survive and unify farmworkers was
because o f the protection of the federal regulations under the deforestation legislation
which covered som e of its m embers. The deforestation legislation provided for a
minimum wage and the right to organize (Kirchm eier 1980, B3). PC U N also aim ed its
m em bership drive towards Mexican and other Latin American migrants who had come
from areas of political activism and had received amnesty under the new legislation.
PCUN organizers had another advantage. They gained the trust o f their fellow
workers because they lived and worked among them. PCUN was organized and led by
Hispanic migrants, most of whom came from Latin America and spoke Spanish as their
first language. They were able to use the loyalty that existed among themselves to
empower the union. They functioned as a family, very cautiously screening whom they
allowed into their ranks. This cohesiveness was reinforced by the history o f governm ent
and farm er harassment they had experienced in Oregon as well as in their previous
hom elands. Suspicion extended even to sympathetic Chicanos, who were at times seen
as anglicized (Francisco J. Rangel, personal interview, 5 July 1990).
PCUN was able to usurp the contractors’ role on some farms because the
farm ers have seen them as m ore reliable and as a fair deal. M ost recently, president
Cipriano Ferrel and the union began organizing to start a pesticide assistance program
to help enforce safety regulations in the field with the help o f the Northwest Coalition
for Alternatives to Pesticides (Rosemary 1989, G2).
The problems that farmworker unionism confronted led PCUN, along with other
activists and migrants, to seek solutions in legislation. Future legislation to protect the
m igrant and prevent the use o f illegals was seen as essential. They wanted to elim inate
the farm ers’ constant use of illegals for strikebreaking and for lowering the wage.
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RESISTANCE T H R O U G H LEGAL ACTION

Historically, an im portant tool for improving conditions for migrants has been the
legal system. Suits have been brought against the farmers and powers that be to
improve conditions and wages as well as to stop the m istreatm ent, violence and
dishonesty o f the employers and the police force. Suits in the late 1960s and early 1970s
were brought against farmers to stop them from preventing activists and government
health officials from entering the camps when the migrants requested help (Bustos 1969;
Cowley 1970; Floyd 1969; Kadera 1969; Mayer 1983; Olmos 1982; Oregonian 18 M arch
1969; Pederm an 1982, Stewart 1982 Wentworth 1960). In the 1970s the first successful
class action suit brought by migrants against farm ers for breach of contract was filed. In
this case 8 residents of New Mexico paid $2,000 for a lawyer to dem and the $8,000 owed
them by the Tankersley farm (Oregonian 14 Decem ber 1971, 12; Rural Tribune
Septem ber 1978, 1).
In 1983 Hispanics demanded that a committee be formed to deal with the
tensions and m istreatm ent o f migrants in Oregon. An incident during the suit o f the
farm er who had assaulted a worker over a wage dispute was used as leverage. In order
to testify in this case several migrants returned from Los Angeles, having spent their own
money to return. They could afford only to stay a short while. Just after they arrived,
the defense attorney requested to postpone testimony of the preliminary hearing in.
This was seen as a tactical move to prevent the arriving migrants from testifying. This
blatant attem pt to limit the ability for the migrants to give testimony and the
immigration raids that had been occurring regularly led to the development of a
conciliation board established by the U.S. Departm ent of Justice to review the treatm ent
migrants received within the judicial system (H ilderbrand 1983, B3).
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As stated before, the Tree Planters’ Union sued the state o f Oregon and its
governor for the use of the picketing law enacted in 1963, which they claimed was a
violation o f freedom of speech. That law was found unconstitutional in 1990. The effect
of lawsuits like these were invaluable to the migrants. The actions o f PC U N and the
help of activists in and outside the Hispanic community advanced the rights and
protection of migrants in Oregon.

ACTIVISM

Activists provided what the migrants’ own community could not. They
understood the workings o f the government and knew how to voice the needs of the
migrants. W here the government or farm er left gaps these volunteer groups rushed to
fill the holes, a process much like digging from here to China. They pressured the
government and tried to check the power o f the farmers. They m arched on Salem in
1968 demanding better conditions, lobbied for better laws and services, set up day care
centers, vocational training, credit unions and information centers, and chaired
workshops and advisory committees. They charted the direction for aid and support,
protection and advocacy.
In the 1950s and 1960s Anglo religious volunteers dom inated this area. Later, as
Chicanos settled in Oregon, they became activists for their community and for their own
people, which included the migrants. These Chicano activists, included am ong them
ex-migrants or children of ex-migrants, paved the way for a new self-sufficiency and
cultural movement. They provided essential resources for the few migrants who have
been able to settle, helping those in poverty struggle to survive a little easier. They
sponsored newspapers, radio stations and programs and television shows. Some
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campaigned for representatives of la raza for city council positions or county seats,
providing a further sense o f community and support for migrants far from hom e. Those
Chicanos in O regon in positions o f power brought m igrant concerns to the courts, the
press and to the city and government.
Examples o f Chicanos who have m ade the condition o f all Chicanos their
business through activism are numerous. Ism ael B arrera, the first Chicano to be hired
as a B ureau o f Labor inspector, regularly risked his career by protesting the conditions
of the camps (Olmos 1969, 24). Ex-migrant D aniel Santos, president o f The Political
Action Com m ittee united successful Chicanos to lobby in Salem. His ability to acquire
donations for this fight proved invaluable as weii (Olmos 1983a, MW D2). Jose Salano,
director o f migrant education for Washington County followed the course his parents set
for him. W hen he was young he was kicked out of school when his parents inquired
about his education. Now he watches the education system to be sure m igrant students
are adequately served (Olmos 1983b, MW B l).
David Loera, another Hispanic runs Mano a Mano, a Salem based non-profit
service organization com m itted to providing unemployed migrants with essentials. Joseph
Gallegos, a University of Portland professor, also an ex-migrant, co-founded the now
defunct Collegio Cesar Chavez at Mt. Angel. M ore recently he com m itted him self to
research which will help migrants gain access to public resources. He reflected on his
studies, used to provide documentation of the needs o f elderly Hispanics in Oregon: "It
shows how an academic institution can be actively involved in the community. I honestly
think it’s our responsibility to be directing projects like this" (Fitzgibbon 1990, MP1).
Anglo activists needed their Chicano peers to act as liaisons. M igrants were
extremely reluctant to receive aid from anyone, volunteer o r government, Anglo or
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Hispanic. Many factors reinforced this hesitancy. They did not know or trust m ost of
these people. The migrants, from past experience, feared the "something for nothing"
service, constantly suspecting that someone was trying to trick them . Frank Ojeda, an
ex-migrant stated the sentim ent well: "We have been used too much, been prom ised too
much" (Floyd 1968, 29). This was heightened by the fact that many could not read
pam phlets given to them by volunteers describing services offered. O ther migrants
feared authorities, especially the government which played a dual role of helping them
and deporting them. Those who were born or lived previously in Latin Am erica may
have found their own country’s authorities untrustworthy, and naturally acted with
caution. Migrants also had a tradition of pride and independence, encouraging them to
rely on themselves for their needs (Lagra 1969; Oregon Migrant Health Project 1969).
Chicano activists could sometimes break the barriers, establishing trust.
Many activists also confronted another barrier. They lacked knowledge o f the
Hispanic language and culture. Activists and government health workers tended to see
the Hispanic belief system as superstitious or invalid. The following 1969 account of the
medicinal belief and ritual system of the migrants shows the complexity o f the situation.
O ne health worker described just one im portant aspect called m al de ojo:
Apparently when we admire something about another
person, we, in effect, put a hex on them. The child will
become ill with elevated tem perature, vomiting, sometim es
convulsions, unless the person doing the admiring cancels
out the "hex" by touching or holding the admiree! The
nurses and the aids learned to touch any child about whom
they were discussing, if possible (Oregon Migrant Health
Project 1969, 181).
Chicano activists also often played the role of guiding other activists to cultural
sensitivity.
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Obviously Hispanic activists could break through this wall far easier than others.
As ex-migrant health worker Irm a DeAnda from El Nino Sano Clinic in H ood River
said: "They receive us because we are brown faces. We speak their language. We
explain things to them" (Stein 1990, L I).
Though most of the organizations’ activists set up in Oregon were non-sectarian
their staffing was often filled with religious activists who held strong beliefs. These
Oregon activists, like others around the nation, sought to provide the basics so that
individuals could strive spiritually instead of being obsessed with survival (Oregon State
Bureau o f Labor 1959; R uether 1970; White and Hopkins 1976). Both the 1958 report
of the Migrant Ministry and the direction of leading activists today point out this
intention (Freedm an 1989; Marx 1989; Oregon State Bureau of Labor 1959).
Though Protestant activists were prominent in social service agencies in Oregon
that worked for the Hispanic migrants, because of the religious convictions o f most
Hispanic migrants, Catholic activists functioned in a m ore intim ate way within the
migrant community. Catholic priests lived among them and Catholic Chicano activists
knew them, spoke their language, understood their culture and were m ore often trusted
(Blackmun 1990; Cockle 1990; Freedm an 1989; Oregonian 23 June 1964). This daily
comm itm ent helped to create communities of activism located in W oodburn, Cornelius,
Dayton, Nyssa, and other small rural towns where migrants stayed or worked nearby.
A transform ation in the direction of many of Oregon’s religious activists occurred
after the 1960s. Through their trials and tribulations Christian activists in Oregon have
gained a stronger conviction and clarity of purpose since the 1950s. Many moved from
part-time charity to direct and constant involvement at the community level. Some also
moved away from direct church involvement because their convictions were m ore radical
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than the churches could tolerate (Marx 1989, 1). They became politically active after
living among o r seeing the conditions of the migrants. These later activists sought to
change migrant conditions, desiring to help m ore than the spiritual needs o f the migrants
to which the M igrant Ministry o f the 1950s and 1960s had confined itself (Austerm ann
1970; Freedm an 1989; Marx 1987).
A new national Catholic movement strengthened O regon Catholic activists and
clergy. Their purpose was to "give the people hope, to educate people in how the system
works so they can confront that system with their power" (Jones 1987, 9). They believed
that the oppressed in the United States were worse off than the oppressed in Latin
Am erican because the poor had no hope or faith in the chance for liberation (McCarthy
1988, 19). In San Antonio, Virgilio Elisondo, religious leader and director o f the San
A ntonio Cultural Center, expressed this new faith in his "Galilean principle" which
proposed that Mexican-Americans and other marginal peoples in the U nited States could
and must, through their pain and rebirth, help others create a new society (Shaull 1984,
99).
Their philosophy included providing encouragement and faith because "so many
o f the poor are so angry, so broken, so inhumanly discouraged and desouled" (McCarthy
1988, 17). These Christian communities developed a strong grassroots emphasis, with
self-sufficiency for the downtrodden as their main goal (McCarthy 1988, 18).
Jose Jaim e, David Zegar and Rodney Page exemplified the religious leadership
o f this activism in Oregon. Jose Jaime, one of the founding m em bers o f El Centro
Cultural in W oodburn, was particularly representative of Chicano activism and o f the the
Catholic grassroots community activism.
Page, a middle-class Protestant, attended seminary, worked in several low-income
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communities, arriving in California in the late 1950s to work with the m igrant farm
community under the M igrant M inistries. H e described his experience there as a turning
point:
To see kids with arm s twisted out o f shape because they’d
been broken and left untreated, to see such grinding
poverty in the camps, the kids drowning in irrigation
ditch es-it was the most earth shaking experience in my
life. I becam e sensitized forever to the social issues o f our
time (Marx 1989, 9).
Page later established the Ecumenical M inistries of Oregon, which now
encompasses 17 denom inations and over 2,000 congregations (Marx 1989, 8). W hile
EM O provided daily services throughout the state, its real power lay in using its prestige
to lobby for those in need.
Jose Jaim e, born and raised in Mexico, was sent to the states to be educated and
ordained. After.vards Jaim e taught migrants at Mt. Angel. Later, one suspects, in order
to work m ore directly with his community, Jaim e left the priesthood to work and live as
a lay person, and his "commitment to living in the religious community began to take a
different perspective." Jaim e attem pted to unite the Hispanic and Anglo forces. His
words reflect the new Catholic activism, "I still strive to feed my faith with their faith"
(Freedm an 1989, 1).
The Reverand Zegar of St. Alexander’ in Cornelius represented a new breed of
Catholic Anglo priests. These few priests were extremely com m itted to their Hispanic
congregations. They were usually bilingual and familiar with various Hispanic cultures.
Zegar fought for migrants in the workplace, the legal system, in social services agencies,
and in the legislature. H e helped pass two bills in 1989 which strengthened the footing
o f the migrants. One requires contractors to provide for migrants when they are brought
up before work is available and the other bill gives migrants better access to social
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service agencies. As vicar for the Hispanic M inistries for the Catholic Archdiocese o f
Portland, Zegar made sure that priests serving in Hispanic communities w ere equipped
to provide for the Hispanic community they work in (Butterworth 1991, C l).
Alongside the religious activists in Oregon there stood sectarians who felt that
these migrants deserved better treatm ent and a stronger representation, and so they
cried out as the voice o f the oppressed, lobbying for government money and new state
labor and housing regulations, successfully increasing funds and drawing attention to the
treatm ent o f migrants (Cargill 1984; Guernsey 1971; Hill 1982; Oregonian 20 July 1958).

CH RO NO LOG Y O F O R EG O N ACTIVISM IN T H E M IG RA N T CO M M U N ITY

Volunteers, both political and religious have been actively aiding Hispanic
m igrants since the 1950s in Oregon. These activists, many religious, began in the 1950s
to organize themselves and, with a small fund, 30 seasonal staff and 300 lay workers,
they set up health clinics, organized recreational activities, offered religious services and
funded a priest to come from Mexico (Olmos 1964, CIO). In 1955 the O regon Council
o f Churches sounded the first organized statewide concern (Slatta 1979, 31). Meanwhile,
in 1955 The Migrant Ministry, sponsored by the Portland Archdiocese, was set up to
research and provide, at this point, purely spiritual guidance for the migrants
(Austerm ann 1970, 31).
In their 1955 report the Migrant Ministry clarified its position, docum enting that
their members were only there to conduct research and provide religious services, not
change conditions. Previously the M igrant Ministry had worked in California, and
possibly they understood the dangers o f crossing the farmers or even appearing to be
doing so. However, it is also possible that initially they were not concerned with altering
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the farm or work conditions of the migrants, since some o f them may have been the
wives o f the farmers who hired these workers (Austermann 1970; Migrant Ministry Report
1955).
The M igrant Ministry found college students from Linfield College, University of
Portland and Pacific University to live year-round in the camps and to organize picnics,
sewing circles, fiestas. They set up nurseries for the children while the parents worked
{Migrant Ministry Report 1955). They also hired priests to come up from Mexico to serve
the migrants. F ather Bravo, from Zam ora, Michoacan, Mexico had been sent yearly
since 1952. His services represented the purely spiritual direction the MM prom oted. In
1964 Father Bravo served 642 families, 192 single men, saying 353 First Co nr -.r.vnions, 49
m arriages, 25 baptisms, 173 confirmations, and tutored catechism to 642 children (Olmos
1964, CIO).
In 1964 the Migrant Ministry, later named the Oregon Friends o f the Migrants,
started the Valley Migrant League (VML), which successfully monopolized government
resources throughout the 1960s and 1970s. It was at this tim e that the "second organized
m ajor manifestation o f concern" occurred when legislators, clergymen, labor contractors,
and citizens came together to apply for an O EO "demo grant" to fund adult education,
sum m er school, day care, and health programs (Slatta 1979, 161). This initial grant sent
80 VISTA volunteers and nearly $700,000 to Oregon (Schulz 1965,10). This grant was
the first of many. Lobbying annually for relatively large sums of federal money under
the O E O ’s "war against poverty," the VML ran VISTA, the Migrant H ealth Project and
m ost summer education programs.
This was a united effort by some of the religious volunteers and the farm ers. In
1965 the VML had 12 growers on its 40 member board o f directors (Olmos 1965, 26). It
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served the purposes of both groups: The farmers could influence the governm ent to
fund the improvements needed instead o f paying for these themselves while the religious
activists got the improvements they felt the migrants desparately needed. The VM L
existed as a non-conflict, friendly, quasi-government agency which gained a lot o f power.
It used its money in non-controversial ways, and lost few supporters among those in
power. As one priest said in 1964 about a health grant that the VM L acquired: "The
program will help growers because it will offer advantages to m igrant workers and will
be an inducem ent for them to come to Oregon this summer" (Schulz 1965, 10).
Because o f the VM L’s superficial goals and the annual cycle of grants that
needed to be renewed, these programs rem ained tem porary and caused a high turnover
o f staff, further reducing any significant or perm anent improvements. As the VML
grew, it also became consumed with governmental regulations connected to its funding,
losing much of its creative initiative (Floyd 1969, 29).
M eanwhile, the direction of some of these religious and political activists within
the VM L continued to change. The difference between the stated goals of the Migrant
Ministry written in the late fifties, and the actions of some religious activists in Klamath
Falls in the 1970s expressed this change. The Migrant Ministry Report purposely clarified
its intent to help only the spiritual needs of the farmworkers. In 1970 the chairman of
the potato grower’s league stated the increasing division between the farm ers and the
local church council in Klamath Falls when the Growers League ordered the volunteers
off o f their farms for political activity. In this later confrontation the league told its old
ally that they were no longer welcome in the farm er-built community hall, complaining
that the Council o f Churches representative,
. . . caused us quite a bit o f trouble and was just not good
for us. We had adverse reports from people in the camps,
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farmers, a county health officer and others. . . . W e’ve
never been happy with the Council o f Churches. It has
seem ed m ore interested in bettering the laborers’ social
standards than their religious needs (Austerm ann 1970, 31;
Migrant Ministry Report 1959, 4).
As these activists sustained their efforts over the years they realized th at little
seem ed to change. The existing statutes were not as strong even as the federal
regulations, and governm ent funding and comm itm ent to enforcem ent rem ained low,
allowing for continued m istreatm ent o f migrants. In the sixties and seventies churches
and activists united to enter the political arena, lobbying for stiffer O regon statutes and
federal grants to protect migrants.
By the late sixties action m ounted. In May of 1967 the Poor People’s M arch on
Salem for 1968 was planned to grieve to Governor Tom McCall for b etter housing in
labor camps, for state codes to be enforced on showers, fresh w ater and toilet facilities,
to have crew leaders licensed as contractors, to stop contractors from busing workers
long distances in overcrowded and ill-equiped buses and to push for the N L R A to begin
covering farmworkers. The march was also a protest against farm ers’ continual refusal
to allow activists onto the camps located on farm ers’ property. Participants included the
National Council of Churches, VIVA, VOCAL, UFW o f Oregon, the A FL-CIO and
local church groups throughout the state (Olmos 1968b, 17; Oregonian 29 January 1967,
24). The march led to some revised legislation (Olmos 1968b, 27).
As pressure was levied on the government to enforce old laws and health officials
leaned on the growers to improve conditions, opposition by the farm ers began to rise as
well. Farm ers, backed by their labor contractors and guards, began to leave the
volunteer organizations, continuing to force the religious organizers off their prem ises,
locking their gates which surrounded the homes of migrants, and intim idating workers
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into silence. As this change occurred conflicts between the bureaucratic charity agencies
and the m ore radical activists arose (K adera 1969, 6).
As the battle pressed on, turmoil rose from within these organizations as well. A
stronger spirit awakened and persisted as Hispanic migrant workers who had clim bed out
o f this labor, backed by concerned citizens and others, became involved, dem anding a
voice in their own lives and those o f their people. It became obvious that a bureaucratic
organization with some questionable motives had mushroom ed and that those who m ade
decisions were not and had never been migrants. The ex-migrants pointed out that
theirs was a different culture and experience and that they best understood the m igrants’
needs and concerns. Ex-migrants and children o f ex-migrants established the Collegio
Cesar Chavez at Mt. Angel to begin the process of self-education among la raza. These
younger activists began to see the VML as maintaining the system instead o f changing it.
A t one U FW m eeting in 1969 this sentim ent was expressed. The ex-migrants were not
enthusiastic about a VML grant for nurseries, instead wishing to direct the effort to
improving wages, "so they could hire their own babysitters" (McNulty 1968, 13).
Many were tired o f the charity-oriented, top-heavy hierarchy which kept activism
confined. A 1957 account in the Portland Oregonian tells of the limitations the charity
organizations instituted. A R ed Cross disaster representative had been reprim anded for
helping migrants in need. H e had entered a Gresham farm to provide food and
transportation for 200 farmworkers who were tricked into coming up in a year when
there was already a large surplus of labor. After one worker com plained to the county
sheriff, the workers had been evicted and left stranded in a hard rain on the roadside.
When the Red Cross worker drove them to the Portland Hotel, a homeless shelter, the
farm er claimed he had trespassed and the R ed Cross officials reprim anded him. He,
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like other activists during this and later times, felt as though the organization had failed
him, and quit after 10 years o f serving as a disaster representative (Penny 1957, 18).
As ex-migrants and m ore militant members within the VM L raised their voices
they were checked. A t first the VML accepted bits and pieces o f these demands, hiring
m ore Hispanics at lower levels until by 1968 15% o f the VML were ex-migrants. "In
most o f the VML’s opportunity centers throughout the W illam ette Valley, however, non
farmworkers continue to hold the operational reins as the transition takes place" (Olmos
1968b, 17). More tension rose as several employees told the press that they were forced
to sign agreements that forced them to not involve themselves in UFW activities
(McNulty 1968, 13).
Then in 1969 the VM L funded the Farm W orkers Hom e (FHF), a self-help
organization which the VML allowed to run at the grassroots level. But the F H F had
very little real decision-making power. Almost no top positions were held by
ex-migrants. N either were there any ex-migrants or Chicanos on the VM L board
(Olmos 1968b, 17).
Pressure ran high, tensions mounted, the Home struggled with its new-found
power for nine m onths and than collapsed in conflict. The ex-migrants failed miserably
at their first attem pt to run a program. Lack of decision-making and resolution skills
hindered the ex-migrants and m ere lip-service support on the part o f the VML led to
internal battles. The press ran a story o f a fight that broke out at one o f the Farm
W orker Hom e Board meetings between a VIVA m em ber and a Farm W orker Hom e
m em ber (Kadera 1969, 6). In response, the VML withdrew funding, tightening its grip
and justifying its top-heavy procedures.
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A t a U FW meeting in the W illamette Valley in which Senator W illner
volunteered his legal services for the union, one ex-VML m em ber proclaim ed the
sentiments o f many Chicano activists: "We want to help ourselves and be treated as
equals." As another one stated: "We feel we understand our problem s and we can find
jobs ourselves, providing we get help from industry" (Olmos 1969, 24). Tension between
the conservative, charity-oriented volunteers and the ex-migrants continued. Senator
W illner stressed that if it was not resolved, "the migrants will be the losers" {Oregonian
January 29, 1967, 24). An im portant process of self-determ ination had began.
The term s of employment at the VML continued to force employees to sign
agreem ents not to work for the UFW. This was the last straw that broke the cam el’s
back, and many quit (Kadera 1969, 6) Consequently, as VML chose to keep its funding,
its m ore radical members left, setting up VIVA and VOCAL.
VIVA (Volunteers in Vanguard Acton), VOCAL (V olunteer Oregon Citizens for
Agricultural Labor), the U nited Farm W orkers o f Oregon and the Campensinos Forum
tried to organize. These groups had m ore of a self-help attitude and a stronger desire to
radically change the economic system. Efforts were also made to set up a cooperative
credit union "in which farm laborers could invest part of their earnings" (Olmos 1967,
C2). These o th er groups’ power also depended on government funding and its political
expectations, and most of that funding had already been taken up annually by the VML,
which by now was extremely efficient in acquiring grants (Bustos 1969, 137; Kadera 1969,
6 ).
Similar battles were being fought elsewhere in the state by Chicano and other
activists. Some hired on for O EO projects in the late sixties in Nyssa came into conflict
with the existing institutions which ran these programs. Activists were working under an
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O E O m igrant education project at T reasure Valley Community College. The
educational content they were teaching perhaps included som e spirited lessons about
fighting back for what they felt the migrants deserved. T he TVCC adm inistrators
reacted with fear; they wanted to m aintain a clear division betw een political philosophies
and governm ent services, not seeing that their own perspective was based on a different,
equally molded, political agenda. Several of these Chicano activists were fired, with the
head of the TVCC claiming that these "outside radicals," supported by C esar Chavez,
were instigating the migrants. Later, after the press took hold o f the story, the fired
were reinstated, with a local Chicano activist of Nyssa replying,
It won't be called or led by Cesar Chavez and his people.
He has all he can do in California. The people involved
and in command will be the Mexican-Americans from right
here (Guernsey 1971, 1).
The drive towards independence would not be easily forthcoming o r painless.
Even within the Chicano contingent some activists supported working within the system
while others chided those "coconuts," brown on the outside, white on the inside, for
selling out (Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 114). They preferred to m aintain their cultural
identity, and wanted their pride back. The feeling existed that those "other" volunteers
were part of the system that had gotten Chicanos and migrants in this mess in the first
place and that the whole system needed changing, a concept the VM L could not accept.
The need for the ex-migrants to learn how to hold and use their own decision-making
power was at hand. And it seem ed as if there were no stopping this process of
empowerment.
The division of the Salud Medical Clinic and the Virginia G arcia M em orial Clinic
in W oodburn was an example of this conflict. The 1979 separation stem m ed from
political differences over the lack o f control the Chicano representatives had in Salud.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

112
As well, they felt that Salud did not let them make their own decisions since Salud held
the m onetary strings (Rural Tribune February 1979, 1).
Throughout the state many religious and political activists moved away from the
VML, joining to support what those in la raza were doing. Now, when a farm er refused
to let a volunteer on the farm to see a migrant who had requested help, instead o f just
walking away as in the past, that volunteer would be m ore likely to go through the legal
system. In 1969 alone sixty affidavits were filed contesting the refusal to allow
volunteers to enter farms where the migrants lived (Guernsey 1971, 1).
On a larger scale, the National Council of Churches and other grassroots
organizations united and protested. This time their voice was beginning to be heard.
Ultimately, their efforts led to the ending o f the bracero program. As well, in 1969
Oregon governor Vic Atiyeh set up an Advisory Committee on Chicano Affairs to
m onitor state laws and programs affecting Hispanics. Even though this com m ittee had
no real power it symbolized the response of the government to this new force (Slatta
1979, 161).
Since the 1970s grassroots groups m ore inclined to take risks have taken a front
seat to the old non-political charity-oriented organizations run by wealthy donors. The
new volunteer agencies were led by leadership which had more direct hands-on
experience. Decisions were m ade with less top-heavy control, and fewer of the "bosses”
(farmers, landowners) to run these agencies. Hispanics, ex-migrants, the sons and
daughters o f ex-migrants, religious, and political activists were the new organizers. They
replaced the old top-heavy style of decision-making which farmers and wealthy
do-gooders controlled. One example of this is the Portland based W om en’s Foundation
of Oregon whose rules required that at least 51% of the board represent its target
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group. One o f its programs attem pted to help Guatem alan migrants become
self-sufficient by helping them to establish m arkets in which the women sold and profited
from their own handwoven fabrics (D ettm an 1990, N2).
This new kind o f organization dedicated to helping the migrant become
self-sufficient flourished in the Chicano community, located in W oodburn and Gervais,
w here the effects have been spellbinding. The H ouse of Zion, El Centro Cultural, the
Salud Medical Clinic, and El Aguila Federal Credit Union along with other community
agencies helped Hispanics to maintain their own culture as well as speak out against
m istreatm ent (Cargill 1984, B l; Cowen 1986a, B l; Durbin 1981, C l).
El Centro Cultural exemplified this new concept of self-help and cultural
independence. El Centro was founded in Washington County in 1972 by twelve
immigrant families who had experienced the people’s problems first hand. They
originally called themselves Las Guadalupanas, meaning the people devoted to O ur Lady
o f Guadalupe.
The m em bers o f El Centro have m aintained their integrity to the present by
rem aining grassroots, relying on volunteers who collectively serve 1,100 hours per month
and adhering to their two main goals: education o f Hispanics, and preservation of their
culture. With Jaim e acting as liaison between the Church and the community, uniting
Hispanic and Catholic activists, "there appears to be an ongoing connectedness between
the Catholic Church and El Centro Cultural, though neither direct funding nor guidance
is provided by the church. It is a connectedness, rather, of spirit and purpose"
(Freedm an 1989, 1).
El C entro greatly aided the migrant and Hispanic communities. In the seventies
El Centro provided a police-community relations class, arts and crafts classes, and a
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monthly newspaper (Slatta 1979, 162). In 1989 El Centro fed between 400 and 1,000
people and served 225 people per day from Cornelius in legal aid, health care, job
services, and other program s aimed at creating self-sufficiency. They also started two
economic projects, one o f which m ade and sold tamales. The other was Ormetex, a
non-profit piecework company working with Tektronix. Sister Mary Louise, who lived
and worked at El Centro explained, "This is an opportunity to both become
self-sufficient and to create jobs for our people" (Freedm an 1989,1; R ural Tribune
February 1979, 1).
Salud Medical C enter, originally named Salud de la Familia, was also started in
1972 by ex-migrants and seasonal workers. With a bilingual staff, it cared for clients
from both the Hispanic and Anglo communities. The Center also visited migrant camps,
bringing health care, distributing condoms, and informing the migrants about the hazards
o f pesticides. Along with its other services Salud ran the largest government Women,
Infant, and Children Project in Oregon (Martinis 1987, D10).
Activism in W oodburn did not end here. In 1984 volunteers set up a 24 hour
beeper service for Hispanics in need. Their bilingual staff provided services for the
W ashington County Community Action Shelter in the hours when it was closed. They
were there at night to serve the political refugees who often arrived in the dark. They
did the little things that were horribly hard for a migrant or a non-English speaker:
collecting a repossessed car, filling out an employment application, buying insurance for
a car, or caring for someone who has been attacked at night (Cargill 1984, B l).
Recently others in the W oodburn community began to insist on fair treatm ent.
Parents united, demanding that their children receive what they needed in the
W oodburn public schools. They organized, clearly understanding the use of effective
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tactics, requesting specific program s such as advanced Spanish oriented for
Spanish-speaking students, and bilingual school handbooks for parents. Some of the
parents created a parent advisory committee, and when that was suspended for
investigating complaints o f discrimination, these same parents continued the battle,
joining together under another name (Ota 1984, A l).
Hispanics united in 1983, after a shooting death o f a m igrant by police.
Hispanics all over O regon dem anded that a court certification program for interpreters
be instituted. Hispanics in W oodburn also challenged the local police departm ent,
attem pting to create a police review panel, and when the city rejected the plan, they
declared they would dem onstrate. They forced the city to comply with its agreem ent to
hire a Hispanic policeman and to train officers in Spanish and cultural awareness.
Statewide, the police began using a new Spanish "Miranda card," which previously had
been stated in English o r in a broken Spanish that literally m ade little sense to
Spanish-speakers.
Following this ordeal, th city tried to appease this force by setting up a panel
consisting of 12 members, including four Hispanics. Although this was still only advisory
it indicated that the Hispanics were a power to be contended with (O ta 1984, A l). The
city also fired a conservative city adm inistrator who had proved to be highly insensitive
to the needs of the Hispanics in the city and, after a national search conducted by six lay
persons, a m ore concilatory administrator, Mike Costine, was hired (C onrood 1985, B2).
The Hispanic community in W oodburn, centered around El C entro Cultural, the
Salud Medical Clinic, and the House of Zion, remained the m ost thoroughly committed
community in Oregon. Their grassroots efforts, community involvement and self-help
emphasis express this. But, elsewhere in Oregon activism has also thrived, with Chicanos
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still leading the way. Since the Imm igration Reform and Control Act o f 1986 private
organizations have had to provide services that government funded agencies were no
longer allowed to do. Following W oodburn’s example, other Catholic churches developed
program s to help m igrants and Hispanics, their involvement often directed towards
empowering people through self-help programs. The following congregations had
especially strong services for the migrants: St Patrick’s in Portland, St. Luke’s in
W oodburn, St. Joseph’s in Salem, St H enry’s in Gresham , the Sisters o f the Holy N am es
at M arylhurst, and the Abbey at Mt Angel (Sansregret 1983, B3). T here are six Catholic
Community Service Hispanic Program s in Oregon each helping between 300 and 600
families each m onth in the sum m er (Perschiera 1990, 4M EP1).
Chicano activists encouraged the press to give coverage to the positive aspects o f
the growing Chicano population in Oregon and to the plight o f the migrant. W hen this
was not effective Spanish publications were created, including La Voz Utiida (El Aguila
publication), the Rural Tribune published by the W ashington County Community Action
Organization in Hillsboro, the bilingual paper, Informa, and the State Concilio (Slatta
1979, 162).
Job training programs were started, with funding from local businesses. And
Chicanos who have risen to good positions have continued to set up comm ittees to
m entor and foster relations with the business community and Hispanics for their people
(Slatta 1975, 340). In the seventies the Chicano-Indian Study Center o f Oregon acquired
10 buildings in Corvallis to begin a job-training center (Slatta and Atkinson 1984, 116).
In the 1970s and 1980s num erous other Chicano organizational groups sprang up
to deal with, among other things, migrant conditions, police relations, high school
dropouts, and public relations. These groups were persistent in battling discrimination
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by local communities, the government, and the courts. Some o f these groups include the
Oregon Coalition for Imm igrant and Refugee Rights, the Hispanic Political Action
Com m ittee, the Hum an Relations Commission, a Northwest chapter of IM A G E,
(Incorporated Mexican-American Governm ent Employees), COSSPO (Commission o f
Spanish Speaking People of or from Oregon), and the Hum an Rights Action Council.
These groups continue to provide leadership for Hispanics in O regon. They will no
doubt continue to lead the way in this most im portant mission.
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CH APTER V

CONCLUSION

Hispanic farmworkers played an im portant role in the economy o f Oregon,
especially after the 1940s. They came in large numbers, increasingly replacing Anglo
workers since the 1950s. As many Mexican-Americans were able to settle out,
undocumented migrants took their place. Young men without their families
outnum bered families in the fields, although children and spouses working beside some
o f the men were not an uncommon sight. In the 1960s m echanization reduced, but did
not eliminate, the num ber o f migrants.
The farm workers’ wages were substandard and their survival generally a
day-to-day struggle. W ork conditions and wages rem ained unregulated under the
NLRA, which helped workers in other jobs better their lives. Even the low wages the
m igrants were supposed to receive by law were not always given.
The sam e lax government regulations that allowed farm ers freedom to pay
whatever wages they wanted also perpetuated horrid living and working conditions.
These conditions were adverse to the health of the migrant. During the bracero program
the government assembled tem porary barracks which were inadequate for the weather.
A fter the 1940s, when farm ers took over the camps, living arrangem ents worsened.
Housing was crowded, unsanitary and inappropiate for the cold, wet springs and
falls and hot summers. W orkers were not protected from the chemicals sprayed on the
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crops and toilet facilities most often were non-existent. The work hours and location
prevented the migrants from eating enough healthy food.
M igrants’ ability to improve their lives was also hindered by th eir lack of
education. Many factors reduced the chance for this opportunity. F o r undocum ented
workers’ children this was an impossible task. But even for farm workers who were U.S.
citizens, work hours, travel, cultural differences, and prejudice w orsened their chances
for success in the school system.
Migrants who have ventured to Oregon over the last century in an effort to
improve their lives have taken risks at every turn. Despite the great odds, som e migrant
families were able to encourage and help their children to succeed. M any o f these same
families moved out of the migrant stream, settling in small towns in O regon. Although
many have come only for the season, others have been able to stay, developing
communities and struggling to retain or adapt their culture to their new needs.
These families created dynamic communities in W oodburn, Nyssa, O ntario,
Cornelius, Gervais, and H ood River. A few of those who have stayed in O regon have
led the way in organizing the fight for those settled out as well as for those who are still
migrating, whose living conditions have improved very little. Some o f these ex-migrants’
children have in turn committed much effort to helping other m igrants better their lives.
Ex-migrants and other community activists, both Chicano and Anglo, stuggled to
help these proud and independent peoples. But other groups resisted this effort.
Contractors, who m ade a living from the migrants, usually had a detrim ental effect upon
their lives. It is unfortunate that contractors and crewleaders were not completely
banned, as they are in Wisconsin, where it has been one o f the underlying reasons why
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families have been able to become m ore self-sufficient, and why unionism has had a
better opportunity to spawn (Wells 1976, 272).
Farm ers’ profits also were m ade from the backs o f these migrants. The cheaper
they could keep this variable factor the better. And as the wealthiest farm ers becam e
m ore rem oved from their workers, they lost perspective on their effect upon the worker
and the inhum ane conditions they put upon them in exchange for the efficiency and
profit they deem ed necessary. T he poorer farmers struggled hard to survive, blaming the
cost of the m igrants instead of the economic system.
The government, largely influenced by the desires o f the large farm ers, continued
to retain weak laws with insufficient legal punitive actions enforced by uncoordinated
agencies. Overlapping authority within the government bureaucracy created limitations
and confusion among those agencies responsible. And on the local level the small rural
counties in which the migrants worked rem ained financially unable to fund programs
which might have com pensated for what the economy, and m ore specifically, the farm ers’
low wages and housing conditions caused.
The role of the growers and contractors also rem ained unchecked, leaving it to
the discretion of each individual involved, whose m onetary interests often dictate his
decision-making, regardless of its effects on the migrants. The economic outlook for
m igrants did and will continue to remain glum as long as com petition within the
Am erican system and with corporations in the Third W orld persists, encouraging farmers
to keep wages and the costs o f benefits and camp conditions low. Though some o f the
Chicano population will move out of migratory labor, others will take their place,
sweating and struggling in the brutal heat o f eastern Oregon and the thick, dam p mud of
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the W illam ette Valley, moving through camps void of much comfort from harvest to
harvest, from year to year without any fair return for their labor.
If the governm ent had not played a role in protecting the farm ers one might
imagine the possibility o f the farmworkers having a m ore equal footing and far greater
power. Farm ers might have been forced to contend with the needs o f the migrants in
order to attract them to work if the government had not regularly stepped in to assure
the farm ers of cheap labor. But this did not happen. This lack of protection and lack of
governm ent support kept the migrants from obtaining any political, social or economic
power.
A new approach should be taken that allows farm ers and workers to join
together, realizing that the health o f one is the health o f the other. Farm ers would do
well to follow the lead o f the farm er Urban Eberhart in eastern Washington. On his 500
acre farm he has initiated a m ore environmental approach to farming, using fewer
chemicals and more natural controls. H e helped to develop a new worker right-to-know
program in cooperation with the state D epartm ent of Labor and Industries in
W ashington, W ashington State University and the Farm Bureau (Rosem aiy 1989, G l).
If even a small percentage of the amount of money that is allotted to agricultural
research was redirected with this emphasis, solutions might be forthcoming.
G overnm ent research could be directed to find more efficient ways to remain labor
intensive while providing a better life for workers. Research could center on labor
intensive efficiency and self-sufficiency, emphasizing organic m ethods of production,
which would further improve work conditions for the majority o f the people.
But, what must occur to set the improvements for migrants in motion is direct
government support. The government must also, at bare minimum, provide protection
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to the farmworkers as they have for all other workers. This should include fair labor
practices, including wages, the right to organize and strike, and safe field and housing
conditions. The government or a union could set up a "hiring hall" to recontract out as
they do in the seasonal building trades. Very stringent laws, or the elim ination of
contractors and crew leaders, should be put into place as well.
As it was, the best resistance the migrants had was their culture, their religion
and their familial ties. Settled Hispanic communities located in the small towns nearby
the fields the farmworkers picked across Oregon regularly refueled these bonds. Union
activism and Chicano advocates also aided the migrants, often through legal cases they
pushed through the courts. Religious and political Anglo activists added their political
influence and know-how to this effort. They improved legislation, insisted on programs
and provided services fo the migrants.
W ithout a drastic change in the performance o f the governm ent and in the
economic system, only some of the symptoms, instead o f the cause, will be eliminated.
W hether this type of restructuring will happen depends on so many factors, but
persistence by Chicano and other activists as well as by the migrants themselves is the
answer. Maybe this should be O regon’s new plan for "economic success."
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